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SHEDDING YOUR SOUL
AT THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE:
THE CHILLING OF STUDENT ARTISTIC SPEECH
IN THE POST-COLUMBINE ERA
Anna Boksenbaum*
INTRODUCTION
Of childhood, Edgar Allen Poe wrote this poem entitled,
Alone :
From childhood’s hour I have not been
As others were; I have not seen
As others saw; I could not bring
My passions from a common spring.
From the same source I have not taken
My sorrow; I could not awaken
My heart to joy at the same tone;
And all I loved, I loved alone.
Then- in my childhood, in the dawn
Of a most stormy life- was drawn
From every depth of good and ill
The mystery which binds me still:
From the torrent, or the fountain,
From the red cliff of the mountain,
From the sun that round me rolled
In its autumn tint of gold,
From the lightning in the sky
As it passed me flying by,
From the thunder and the storm,
And the cloud that took the form
(When the rest of Heaven was blue)
Of a demon in my view.1
Poe, famous for the macabre poems and short stories he published
as an adult, was obsessed with death and the details of death begin-
ning in his early childhood.  His obsession is evident in letters he
wrote during his early years which “reflect an excessive delight in
* Anna Boksenbaum, J.D. 2005, City University of New York Law School.  Thanks
to Professor Ruthann Robson, Elena Riverstone, my mother and research assistant,
Erik Pitchal at Children’s Rights Inc., Steve Mosqueda, and all my friends and family.
1 EDGAR ALLEN POE, COMPLETE TALES AND POEMS OF EDGAR ALLEN POE
(1849), available at http://www.internal.org/list_book.phtml?bookID=9 (last visited
Dec. 8, 2004).
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graphic, gory details.”2  As a teenager, Poe was already writing
poems, and he completed his first volume of poetry by age sixteen.
He is not the only writer whose writing helped him cope with a
painful childhood.  Charles Bukowski’s biographer writes of
Bukowski as a teenager, “[i]ndeed, suicide and self-destruction be-
come major themes of Bukowski’s work: he referred to himself as
‘the suicide kid.’”3  Like Poe and Bukowksi, Eugene O’Neill began
writing poetry in his teen years.  One biographer writes, “It seems
certain that the playwright’s adult writing grew out of and was an
extension of the fantasizing, reading and writing that in childhood
helped the boy withstand episodes of acute separation anxiety
. . . .”4
These writers had difficult childhoods.  Bukowski’s father was
often drunk and abusive.5  Poe’s parents died when he was a tod-
dler leaving him to be raised by unwilling foster parents.6  Eugene
O’Neill was born in a hotel and spent his formative years traveling
with the theater company that employed his parents.  He was ex-
posed to his mother’s drug addiction and his parents’ unsteady re-
lationship until he was sent to boarding school where he began to
drink heavily.7
As children these writers were probably not the most likeable
students.  Bukowksi suffered from terrible feelings of insecurity, de-
pression, and isolation.8 Eugene O’Neill was already exhibiting the
2 Karen Bernardo, Edgar Allen Poe (1809-1849), at http://www.storybites.com/poe.
htm (last visited Dec. 8, 2004).
3 Writing and literature were extremely important to Charles Bukowski.  Jack Fo-
ley, a book reviewer states, “Like other troubled adolescents, Bukowski took refuge in
books.  The local library provided him with ‘the only heaven I had ever felt.’”  Bukow-
ski’s biographer, Neeli Cherkovski further comments,
The books he read taught him that he had not given in to the norms of
society, and was not diminished by his father’s cruelty. . . . An inner
revolt had taken hold of him, ideas that would later surface in his writ-
ing, about how the entire structure of society was populated by smooth-
talking phonies . . . he knew that his isolation would become his
strength . . . he envisioned himself as the singular self, forging his own
destiny.
Jack Foley, Poetry Previews: Charles Bukowski, available at http://www.poetrypreviews.
com/poets/poet-bukowski.html (last visited Dec. 8, 2004) (quoting NEELI CHERVOV-
SKI, BUKOWKSKI: A LIFE (1997)).
4 STEPHEN A. BLACK, EUGENE O’NEILL: BEYOND MOURNING AND TRAGEDY 63, 64
(1999).
5 See, e.g., Foley, supra note 3.
6 See Qrisse’s Edgar Allan Poe Pages, Edgar’s Childhood, at http://www.poede-
coder.com/Qrisse/allans.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2004).
7 See Britannica Guide to the Nobel Prizes, Eugene O’Neill, The Winners, at http://
www.britannica.com/nobel/micro/438_61.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2004).
8 See, e.g., Foley, supra note 3.
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short temper and mood swings symptomatic of alcoholism in high
school.9 Poe played such realistic practical jokes involving death
and dying that he truly frightened his friends and family.10  Like-
able or not, these writers used their pain to fuel their work, and as
a result each has left an indelible mark on American literature and
its readers.  Poe channeled his childhood obsession with death and
his own torment into a great literary talent which critics agree
serves as the foundation for American horror.11  Bukowski and
O’Neill both reached into their most personal childhood suffering
and used it to create uncomfortable, raw, and beautiful autobio-
graphical poems, plays, short stories, and novels that have allowed
readers to reflect on their own innermost conflict.
In 2000, James LaVine, a junior in high school, wrote this
poem, entitled Last Words and shared it with his English teacher to
get her feedback:12
As each day passed, I watched, love sprout, from the most, un-
likely places, wich reminds, me that, beauty is in the eye’s, of the
beholder.
As I remember, I start to cry, for I, had leared, this to late, and
now, I must spend,
each day, alone, alone for supper, alone at night, alone at death.
Death I feel, crawlling down, my neck at, every turn, and so, now
I know, what I
must do.
I pulled my gun, from its case, and began to load it.
I remember, thinking at least I won’t, go alone, as I, jumpped in,
the car, all I
could think about, was I would not, go alone.
As I walked, through the, now empty halls, I could feel, my hart
pounding.
As I approched, the classroom door, I drew my gun and, threw
open the door,
BANG, BANG, BANG-BANG.
When it all was over, 28 were, dead, and all I remember, was not
felling, any
remorce, for I felt, I was, clensing my soul,
I quickly, turned and ran, as the bell rang, all I could here, were
screams, screams of friends, screams of co workers, and just
9 BLACK, supra note 4, at 85.
10 See Bernardo, supra note 2.
11 National Park Service, National Historic Site Park Brochure: Edgar Allen Poe, at
http://www.nps.gov/edal/brochure.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2005).
12 This poem and others included in this article are reproduced without spelling
and grammar correction.
126 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:123
plain, screams of shear horor, as the students, found their,
slayen classmates,
2 years have passed, and now I lay, 29 roses, down upon, these
stairs, as now, I feel, I may, strike again.
No tears, shall be shead, in sarrow, for I am, alone, and now, I
hope, I can feel, remorce, for what I did, without a shed, of
tears, for no tear, shall fall, from your face, but from mine, as I
try, to rest in peace, BANG!13
Undoubtedly, James would have kept his work to himself if he had
known that the poem would result in his emergency expulsion14
from school, a lengthy court battle first over whether his poem was
speech protected by the First Amendment, and then, once he re-
turned to school, a fight regarding whether the incident should
remain in his official disciplinary record.15  Unfortunately, James’s
experience is not unique.  In fact, compared to other students who
have been permanently expelled and adjudicated delinquent for
creating drawings and poems depicting violence in school, he suf-
fered a relatively light punishment.
This Article discusses the future of student speech rights and
artistic speech in general through six cases involving students who
were punished with expulsion and delinquency proceedings for
creating violent poems, stories, and drawings about school.  It ex-
amines how the trend toward punishing students for creative
speech may affect emerging young artists and the future of art in
this country.  It also examines the use of the events at Columbine
High School as the backdrop for the development of such harsh
school disciplinary actions.  Ultimately, it hypothesizes that stu-
dents may have a variety of reasons for creating artwork and poetry
that depict violence, and exposes the unfairness of the assumption
made by the courts and school administrators that students’ sole
motivation for such artwork is to threaten a future act of violence.
On April 20, 1999 Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris walked into
Columbine High School and opened fire on teachers and class-
mates,16 sending a wave of fear across the country and placing
13 LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 983 (9th Cir. 2001).
14 The court explains that emergency expulsion according to Washington Admin-
istrative Code may occur when the “superintendent . . . has good and sufficient reason
to believe that the student’s presence poses an immediate and continuing danger to
the student, other students, or school personnel or an immediate and continuing
threat of substantial disruption of the educational process.  An emergency expulsion
shall continue until rescinded by the superintendent or his or her designee.” LaVine,
257 F.3d. at 985 n.3.
15 Id. at 986.
16 Mike Anton, Death Goes to School with Cold, Evil Laughter, DENVER ROCKY MOUN-
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school violence under a nationwide magnifying glass.  Despite solid
statistics that youth violence, especially violence in school, fell sig-
nificantly between 1992 and 2002,17 the legacy of Columbine has
cast a dark cloud over the nation’s perception of the safety of pub-
lic schools and the stability of the children who attend them.
One of the most insidious casualties of that day at Columbine
High School is students’ First Amendment right to creative expres-
sion in school.  In the name of preventing another Columbine, in-
creasingly inflexible school disciplinary policies have significantly
chilled student speech rights.18  Using the events at Columbine
High School as justification, schools are treating artwork and draw-
ings with violent content as if they are weapons and death threats,
and taking extremely harsh disciplinary action against students
who produce such work.19
In response to the intense media attention given to the school
shootings in the mid-1990s, administrators and law enforcement
under pressure to prevent similar incidents scrambled to create a
profile of the typical “school shooter.”20  In 2000, the National
Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime and the Department of
Justice published a “checklist” of ways to identify a potential school
shooter entitled “The School Shooter: A Threat Assessment Per-
spective.”21  Creation of violent writing and drawings made the
TAIN NEWS, Apr. 21, 1999, http://denver.rockymountainnews.com/shooting/
0421top00.html; Christopher Anderson & Matt Sebastian, Worst School Shooting in US
History Kills Up to 25 in Littleton, DAILY CAMERA, Apr. 21, 1999, http://www.boulder
dailycamera.com/shooting/21lead.html.
17 Press Release, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Nation’s School Crime Rate Contin-
ues to Decline (Nov, 29, 2004), at http://www.justicepolicy.org/article.php?id=463
[hereinafter Nation’s School Crime Rate Continues to Decline]; DEVOE, J.F. ET AL.,
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. & U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME AND SAFETY:
2004 (2004), at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/iscs04.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF
EDUC. & U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 1999 ANNUAL REPORT ON SCHOOL SAFETY 4 (1999), avail-
able at http://www.ed.gov/PDFDocs/InterimAR.pdf (statistics demonstrating a de-
cline between 1993 and 1998).
18 See infra Part IV.
19 See infra Part II, IV.
20 See Jennifer Brady & Linda Lumsden, Profiling Students for Violence, at http://
www.guidancechannel.com/ezine.asp?index=567%20&cat-13 (last visited Dec. 16,
2004) (quoting MARY ELLEN O’TOOLE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE SCHOOL SHOOTER:
A THREAT ASSESSMENT PERSPECTIVE (2000)).
21 MARY ELLEN O’TOOLE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE SCHOOL SHOOTER: A THREAT
ASSESSMENT PERSPECTIVE (2000), available at http://www.atapusa.org/downloads/
fbiss.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2004).  This report denies that it is a checklist and even
issues a cautionary statement that the list should not be used as such.  However, the
dissent to the decision in In re Douglas D. cites to this list and argues that Douglas’s
criminal conviction should have been upheld.  This demonstrates how such a list of
factors is easily transformed into a list of indicators.  In re Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d
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list.22  Since then, there have been legal challenges to the dramatic
disciplinary actions taken against students whose artwork and writ-
ings depicted school violence.23  Although some believe that a
child should not spend ninety days in juvenile detention for hand-
ing another student a poem, the decisions in these cases illustrate
that many school administrators and judges believe that a punitive
response to student creative expression is both a permissible and
justifiable restriction of students’ First Amendment rights in
school.24
This Article considers the ramifications of using Columbine as
the backdrop for decisions regarding student speech rights in
school.  Recent decisions in which courts have sanctioned harsh
punishment of students for writing and drawings containing vio-
lent images illustrate the extent to which courts are willing to in-
fringe on students’ free speech rights in the name of school
security.25  This Article cautions against the inclusion of creative
expression such as writing and art in the categories of permissibly
regulated student speech.  Primarily, this Article suggests that stu-
dent artwork be treated as art and afforded the constitutional pro-
tections that adult artwork enjoys.  Further, it recommends that
student artwork deserves a student-centered response and should
be approached from a mental health rather than a punitive
perspective.
The public focus on school security has led judges to use the
“true threat” analysis of student speech that is violent in content.
This analysis is used to determine whether a speaker intended to
make an actual threat.  As argued in Section V Part A, the use of
725, 752 (Wis. 2001) (Prosser, J., dissenting).  As noted by Brady, supra note 20, one
of the biggest problems with profiling is that experts do not agree on what factors are
proper indicators that a student may become violent.
22 O’TOOLE, supra note 21, at 16. The report discusses violent student artwork in
the context of an emotional phenomenon it calls “leakage.” “ ‘Leakage’ occurs when a
student intentionally or unintentionally reveals clues to feelings, thoughts, fantasies,
attitudes, or intentions that may signal an impending violent act. . . . They may be
spoken or conveyed in stories, diary entries, essays, poems, letters, songs, drawings,
doodles, tattoos, or videos. . . .  Leakage can be a cry for help, a sign of inner conflict,
or boasts that may look empty but actually express a serious threat.  Leakage is consid-
ered to be one of the most important clues that may precede an adolescent’s violent
act. . . . [An] example of leakage could be recurrent themes of destruction or violence
appearing in a student’s writing or artwork.  The themes may involve hatred,
prejudice, death, dismemberment, mutilation of self or others, bleeding, use of exces-
sively destructive weapons, homicide, or suicide.” Id.
23 See infra Part II.
24 Id.
25 Id.
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this analysis26 to examine student artwork treats art as a weapon,
impermissibly abrogates student speech rights in school, and
teaches students that making art is a punishable crime.  Such treat-
ment of student art has the immediate effect of significantly chil-
ling student expressive speech and narrows students’
understanding of the definition and role of art and artists in soci-
ety.  Further, it is unnecessary to silence student artistic speech in
order to maintain safety in the public schools.  In fact, preventing
students from venting natural adolescent anger and frustration
may increase the risk that they will lash out in a violent manner.
The solution to this problem is a change in the perspective of
school administrators and courts.  Violent artwork and writing is
more effectively approached with a response that recognizes the
therapeutic value of art as a mode of expression for children and
respects the unique privileges afforded art under the First
Amendment.27
There are a variety of reasons that courts and school adminis-
trators should implement an alternative to the true threat analysis
when examining student artwork.  Section II of this article exam-
ines the Supreme Court’s current perspective on student speech
rights, focusing on the conservative, school-centered direction the
Court’s decisions have taken since the 1980’s.  Section III presents
several of the most recent cases involving students who have cre-
ated artwork, stories, and poems that school officials believed were
dangerous enough to warrant expulsion, and in some cases, the
filing of delinquency petitions in juvenile court.  Section III dis-
sects what this article will call the “myth of Columbine.”  It ques-
tions the use of the mass violence at Columbine High School and
other well-publicized incidents of school violence as an indicator of
the status of the nation’s public schools, as the “judicial backdrop”
for the decisions, and as the justification for chilling student crea-
tive speech.
26 The true threat analysis derives from the Supreme Court case Watts v. United
States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969), in which Watts was prosecuted for making a threat to
harm the President of the United States.  Since then, the analysis has been used in
criminal cases as the basis for prosecutions for disorderly conduct, stalking, extortion,
and threats against government officials like judges, law enforcement, and the Presi-
dent of the United States. See infra notes 62, 63.  The cases in which students are
referred to juvenile court for their artwork require the artwork to be a true threat in
order for the conviction to stand. See infra Section V Part A.  There are two different
versions of the true threat analysis, covered in depth in Section II.  Generally, the test
focuses on whether the content of the speech is so strong that it could really inspire
fear in the listener that it would be carried out. See infra Section II.
27 See infra Section V Part B.
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Section V discusses the impact of the decisions examined in
Section II on individual students, student speech rights in general,
and students’ broader understanding of the role of art and artists
in society.  This section is divided into four subsections.  Part A ex-
plores how the analysis of student creative expression under the
true threat doctrine turns art into weaponry and ascribes an intent
to children’s drawings that is out of sync with current psychology
about children and artwork.  It also considers broader societal
ramifications of treating children’s artwork as a threat, and how
such treatment teaches students at an early age that personal ex-
pression through art is a punishable activity, especially if the art’s
content is controversial or challenges the status quo.  Part B exam-
ines how the cases expand the reach of the “substantial distur-
bance” doctrine, which courts use to decide whether a student’s
speech is protected by the First Amendment.28 This doctrine,
which asks whether speech has created a “substantial disturbance”
to ordinary school discipline, has been broadened such that it allo-
cates nearly absolute discretion to teachers and administrators to
define what creative expression is acceptable.  Part C considers
what the courts fail to—that art is a non-violent way for students to
express negative feelings and that it can be an incredibly powerful
expressive tool.  If properly treated, art could prevent violent out-
bursts like the ones so feared by school administrators.  Finally,
Part D proposes alternatives to understanding artwork as a state-
ment of intent, including psychological and social reasons that
children may create artwork that is violent in nature.
Section V proposes alternatives to the current judicial perspec-
tive on school safety and the reaction of school administrators to
student artwork with violent content.  It begins by suggesting that
the courts afford student artwork the same constitutional protec-
tions accorded to adult artwork.  Alternatively, should courts per-
sist in applying the true threat doctrine, they should take into
consideration the possibility that the work is jest, hyperbole, or
merely innocuous.29  Such a change in analysis is possible if courts
discard the “myth of Columbine,” recognize the numerous statisti-
cal reports that demonstrate that public schools are actually the
safest places for children to be, and adopt a new backdrop for ex-
amining the disciplinary actions taken by school administrators.  Fi-
nally, this Article suggests that sending a child who creates violent
artwork to juvenile court is incredibly detrimental to the child’s
28 Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
29 In re Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d 725, 739 (Wis. 2001).
2005]SHEDDING YOUR SOUL AT THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE 131
well-being.  Instead, mental health-centered, child-based ap-
proaches to particularly violent or disturbing artwork would help
at-risk students, rather than re-traumatizing them or exacerbating
the psychological disturbance that led them to create the artwork
in the first place.
II. STUDENT SPEECH WITHIN THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATES
Society relies on public schools to fulfill a variety of conflicting
societal needs that extend far beyond the scope of academic educa-
tion.  The Supreme Court has alternatively treated schools as a
marketplace of ideas,30 a non-public forum under the heavy thumb
of the school board and school administrators,31 a training center
for future participants in democracy,32 and a moral training
ground for young and impressionable minds.33
Recently, the discussion of schools as institutions with an edu-
30 “The classroom is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas.’  The Nation’s future
depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of
ideas. . . .”  Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969) (citing Keyishian
v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
31 Both Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 473 U.S. 675 (1986), and Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988), assert the primacy of the school board
and the status of the school as non-public forum as necessary to support the educa-
tional mission of the school. The Court in Bethel explicitly states, “[t]he determina-
tion of what manner of speech in the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate
properly rests with the school board.” Bethel, 478 U.S. at 683.  Interestingly, by decid-
ing that public schools are not public forums for the purposes of First Amendment
analysis, the Supreme Court prevented them from truly being public places, which,
“time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions,” and placed great discre-
tion in the hands of school officials to “impose reasonable restrictions on the speech
of students, teachers, and other members of the school community.” Kuhlmeier, 484
U.S. at 265 (internal quotations and citations omitted).  The Kuhlmeier Court also de-
cided that Tinker would not apply when a school refuses to lend its “name and re-
sources” to student expression so long as the school’s, “actions are reasonably related
to legitimate pedagogical concerns. . . . This standard is consistent with our oft-ex-
pressed view that the education of the nation’s youth is primarily the responsibility of
parents, teachers, and state and local school board officials, and not of federal
judges.” Id. at 267, 273.
32 In Bethel, the Court emphasizes, “that ‘[p]ublic education must prepare pupils
for citizenship in the Republic . . . .  It must inculcate the habits and manners of
civility as values . . . indispensable to the practice of self-government in the community
and the nation.’” Bethel, 478 U.S. at 681 (citations omitted).  The court continues,
“[i]n Ambach v. Norwick, we echoed the essence of this statement of the objectives of
public education as the ‘inculcation of fundamental values necessary to the mainte-
nance of a democratic political system.’” Id. (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S.
68, 76-77 (1979)).
33 “The process of educating our youth for citizenship in public schools is not
confined to the books, the curriculum, and the civics class; schools must teach by
example the shared values of a civilized social order.” Bethel, 478 U.S. at 683.
132 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:123
cational purpose has become overshadowed by school safety rheto-
ric.  In fact, schools’ function as a place of learning is markedly
absent from the debate about school discipline.  Rather, the events
at Columbine High School and the “Zero Tolerance” philosophy34
have become the focus of discussion.35  The creative expression
34 Zero tolerance policies, as enacted by public schools, provide automatic, pre-
determined punishments for any violation of certain school rules, irrespective of a
legitimate explanation for the violation.  They most commonly address the possession
of drugs and weapons on school grounds.  Zero tolerance was originally imported
into schools by the 1994 Gun-Free Schools Act but gained momentum and popularity
in the wake of Columbine.  Fact Sheet, Building Blocks for Youth, at http://www.
buildingblocksforyouth.org/issues/zerotolerance/facts.html (last visited Jan. 29,
2005).  The Act provides, “[e]ach State receiving Federal funds under any subchapter
of this chapter shall have in effect a State law requiring local educational agencies to
expel from school for a period of not less than 1 year a student who is determined to
have brought a firearm to a school, or to have possessed a firearm at a school, under
the jurisdiction of local educational agencies in that State, except that such State law
shall allow the chief administering officer of a local educational agency to modify
such expulsion requirement for a student on a case-by-case basis if such modification
is in writing.”  20 U.S.C. § 7151.  School zero tolerance policies are derived from
mandatory sentencing guidelines originally enacted for adult offenders.  Such
schemes have generally been ruled to be too strict to survive constitutional scrutiny.
Ralph C. Martin, ABA Zero Tolerance Policy Report, at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/
juvjus/zerotolreport.html (Feb. 2001).  However, these policies are now extremely
common in our nation’s public schools. See Fact Sheet, Building Blocks for Youth, at
http://www.buildingblocksforyouth.org/issues/zerotolerance/facts.html. The result
of zero tolerance is that the definitions of “weapon” and “drug” have been so greatly
expanded that students often find themselves unwittingly in violation of the policy.
The creative expression cases are an excellent example of this because the courts are
examining whether the artwork or writing is a weapon or a threat that puts them
within the reach of the policy.  The policy’s automatic punishments do not distinguish
between student offenses.  This has led to many widely publicized incidents in which
students have been expelled for completely innocent actions.  Various examples in-
clude: a student expelled for using Listerine, which because of its alcohol content is a
drug; a student expelled for bringing a manicure kit to school because the one-inch
nail file is a “weapon;” and a school that refused to allow a young boy to have his
inhaler at school because its contents were considered a “drug,” which resulted in the
boy’s death.  Martin, supra. Also disturbing is the documented discriminatory impact
zero tolerance policies have had on students of color, who are more likely to be
targeted than Caucasian students. See Kim Brooks, et al., School House Hype: Two Years
Later, Section: Public Fear v. Reality: School Crime & Juvenile Arrest Date (Justice
Policy Inst., Wash. D.C.), Apr. 2000, available at http://www.justicepolicy.org (on file
with the New York City Law Review) [hereinafter School House Hype].
35 As Sam Blank notes “public demands for effective measures aimed at curtailing
youth violence have grown commensurately.  At the state and national levels, the re-
sponse from policymakers to the surge in youth violence has primarily come in the
form of ‘get tough’ measures, including substantial increases in funding for law en-
forcement and corrections, and increased penalties for juveniles convicted of offenses
involving the use of violence.”  Sam Blank, Addressing Youth Violence in America’s Schools,
at  http://www.guidancechannel.com/ezine.asp?index=1191&cat=13 (last visited Dec.
16, 2004).  This is unfortunate in light of the fact that emphasizing discipline over
education can actually result in more violent schools.  A recent report by the National
Center for Education statistics reveals that “[t]he percentage of students who princi-
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cases examined in this Article illustrate the extent of the negative
impact of the Columbine rhetoric on the First Amendment protec-
tions accorded to students.  It is within the debate over school disci-
pline that our societal and cultural attitudes about school and
children are revealed in their most naked and sometimes ugly real-
ity.  Fundamentally, the debate over free speech in schools can be
distilled to a debate over whether schools function primarily as a
marketplace of ideas or a moral training ground.  In the wake of
Columbine and other incidents of large-scale school violence,36
there is no question that the moral training ground function is in-
creasingly obscuring the idea that schools should provide an open
marketplace of ideas.
The Supreme Court in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School
District laid the constitutional foundation for students’ First
Amendment rights in school.37  Its unequivocal statement that
“[s]tudents or teachers [do not] shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,”38 is a
veritable mantra for those attempting to preserve freedom of ex-
pressive speech and conduct in the school setting.  In 1969, the
court in Tinker condemned the suspension of three students who
wore black armbands to school to protest the war in Vietnam.39
Categorizing the armbands as expressive speech, the Supreme
Court set a high standard of justification for schools seeking to pro-
hibit the expression of student ideas.  The Court’s test places the
burden on the school to show that the student speech being regu-
pals felt considered academics to be very important was inversely related to the preva-
lence of violent and serious violent incidents.  As the percentage of students who
considered academics important increased, the likelihood of schools experiencing a
violent or serious violent incident decreased.” AMANDA K. MILLER & KATHRYN CHAN-
DLER, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, VIOLENCE IN THE U.S. PUBLIC
SCHOOLS 2000 SCHOOL SURVEY ON CRIME AND SAFETY 5 (2003), available at http://
nces.ed.gov/pubs2004/2004314.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2004).
36 On March 24, 1998, in Jonesboro, Arkansas, a teacher and four students were
killed and ten students were injured when Mitchell Johnson, 13, and Andrew Golden,
11, shot at their classmates and teachers from the woods while everyone was outside
during a false fire alarm.  On December 1, 1997, at Heath High School in West Padu-
cah, Kentucky, Michael Carneal, 14, opened fire on his fellow students during a
prayer circle.  He killed three and wounded five.  Also widely covered by the media
was the May 21, 1998, incident at Thurston High School in Springfield, Oregon in
which Kip Kinkel, age 15, killed two students and wounded twenty-two when he
opened fire in the school cafeteria. A Time Line of Recent Worldwide School Shootings,
available at http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0777958.html (last visited Dec. 7,
2004).
37 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
38 Id.
39 Id.
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lated “‘materially and substantially interfere[s] with the require-
ments of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school’”40
or “impinge[s] upon the rights of other students.”41  The decision
placed special emphasis on the nature of the armbands as quiet
and peaceful vehicles of expression that created no tangible distur-
bance in the school setting.42
During the same time period, courts placed some restrictions
on student speech that countered Tinker’s more liberal approach.
For example, in 1973, the Ninth Circuit narrowly defined judicial
deference to the discretion of school officials in Karp v. Becken,
which explained that the responsibility to oversee school function-
ing “carries with it the inherent authority to prescribe and control
conduct in the schools.”43
Tinker’s conception of a school as a “marketplace of ideas” has
been dramatically narrowed in the past twenty years.  Courts have
increasingly used student challenges to restrictions on speech to
further limit the right to free speech in the school environment.
In 1986, the Court decided Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,44
in which a high school student was suspended from school for
three days and barred from speaking at graduation for making a
sexually suggestive nomination speech at a student election assem-
bly.45 Bethel carved out one of the most powerful exceptions from
Tinker when it ruled that school administrators could regulate stu-
dents’ school-sponsored speech if they believed it was lewd or ob-
scene, and that such regulation was an acceptable restriction of
40 Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
41 Id.
42 Id. at 508 (“The school officials banned and sought to punish petitioners for a
silent, passive expression of opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbance
on the part of petitioners.  There is here no evidence whatever of petitioners’ inter-
fere, actual or nascent, with the schools’ work or of collision with the rights of other
students to be secure and to be let alone.”).
43 477 F.2d 171, 174 (9th Cir. 1973).
44 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986).
45 Bethel revolves around a speech given by the respondent in support of another
student’s candidacy for high school student government. Its content:
I know a man who is firm – he’s firm in his pants, he’s firm in his shirt,
his character is firm – but most . . . of all, his belief in you, the students
of Bethel, is firm.  Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and
pounds it in.  If necessary, he’ll take an issue and nail it to the wall.  He
doesn’t attack things in spurts – he drives hard, pushing and pushing
until finally – he succeeds.  Jeff is a man who will go to the very end –
even the climax, for each and every one of you.  So vote for Jeff for
A.S.B. vice-president – he’ll never come between you and the best our
high school can be.
Id. at 687.
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students’ First Amendment rights.46
Bethel represented a new emphasis on the moral content of
student speech.  The Court’s decision that sexually suggestive
speech was unprotected by the First Amendment dealt a serious
blow to Tinker’s liberal approach, as it gave deference to school ad-
ministrators to decide what kind of speech is permissible in school
and gave schools responsibility for inculcating students into com-
munity morals and standards of behavior.47
Accompanying this new stance of moral judgment was a new
emphasis on the need for discipline in the school setting and an
increased deference to schools’ decisions about appropriate con-
duct and moral character in the context of the community.  Essen-
tially, Tinker’s balance between student rights to free speech and a
school’s interest in preventing chaos gave way to a new school-cen-
tered approach that no longer required the school to assert a tangi-
ble disruption.  Rather, a threat to moral standards became a
substantial disruption unprotected by the First Amendment.48  As
the Court stated, “[t]he process of educating our youth for citizen-
ship in public schools is not confined to books, the curriculum,
and the civics class; schools must teach by example the shared val-
ues of a civilized social order.”49  Another important aspect of the
decision was its reliance on the fact that the student’s speech took
place at a school-sponsored event.50  This distinction between the
speech in Tinker, which was not part of an official school activity,
and the curricular speech in Bethel, which occurred under the
sponsorship of the school, has important implications in decisions
like Kuhlmeier, the next important school case following Bethel.
Bethel paved the way for increased restrictions on school-spon-
sored student speech.  Most notable is the decision in Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier.51  Journalism students at Hazelwood
High School brought an action against the school for removing
46 “Surely it is a highly appropriate function of public school education to prohibit
the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse.” Id. at 683.
47 The court in Bethel states, “[t]he undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular
and controversial views in schools and classrooms must be balanced against the soci-
ety’s countervailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially appropri-
ate behavior.” Id. at 681.  The freedom to advocate unpopular views accorded by
Tinker is now balanced against a moral code of socially appropriate behavior devel-
oped by school officials.
48 “The First Amendment does not prevent the school officials from determining
that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech such as respondent’s would undermine the
school’s basic educational mission.” Id. at 683.
49 Id. at 683.
50 Id. at 677.
51 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
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two pages of a newspaper they wrote in the school’s journalism
class.52  The censored pages contained interviews with three preg-
nant teens who attended the school and an article that featured a
student’s experiences with her parents’ divorce.53 Kuhlmeier is inter-
esting because of its reliance on the threat to the privacy interests
of the students who served as the anonymous subjects of the cen-
sored articles.54  By allowing the school’s concern about protecting
student privacy and shielding innocent younger students from in-
appropriate material to trump students’ right to speak, the Court
significantly increased school discretion to regulate student
speech.55  A school principal can now regulate speech he or she
believes is obscene and also any speech deemed unfit for the ears
of other students, even if the speech is essentially academic in
nature.
The Kuhlmeier decision limited judicial review of school regula-
tion of student speech.  Further, the Court expanded the reach of
moral judgment into such speech by establishing a special level of
acceptable censorship within the school environment.  As the
Court explained “[a] school need not tolerate student speech that
is inconsistent with its basic educational mission, even though the
government could not censor similar speech outside the school.”56
Columbine and similar incidents have set the stage for the
drastic restriction of Tinker.  With the advent of zero-tolerance poli-
cies57 and metal detectors in schools, police, handcuffs, and crimi-
nal charges have replaced the old remedies of suspension from
school and activities.  As the consequences for student misbehavior
have dramatically increased, so has the level of fear and suspicion
over student speech.  The most recent decisions regarding student
poems, stories, and paintings that were created about school de-
pend on the precedent of limiting student speech.  The cases in-
volving students disciplined for artwork and stories have relied on a
52 Id. at 262-64.
53 Id. at 263.
54 Id. at 264.
55 Id. at 273 (“[W]e hold that educators do not offend the First Amendment by
exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in their
school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns.”).  The Court also recognized that “[a] number of
lower federal Courts have similarly recognized that educators’ decisions with regard
to the content of school-sponsored newspapers, dramatic productions, and other ex-
pressive activities are entitled to substantial deference.” Id. at 273 n.7.
56 Id. at 266 (citations omitted).
57 See supra note 34.
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hybrid of First Amendment true threat analysis58 and traditional
student speech analysis.  Significantly, although courts consistently
emphasize that students have reduced First Amendment rights in
school59 and a lesser right to free speech than adults, they liberally
assign adult criminal sanctions to student speech.
Interestingly, the “curricular speech” distinction, defined in
Kuhlmeier, is inverted in the creative expression cases.  While the
court in Kuhlmeier accorded great deference to the school because
the speech at issue was curricular, the cases examining student art-
work are more deferential to the student where artwork is curricu-
lar rather than independently executed.60  However, this
distinction does not insulate student creative expression from regu-
lation made permissible by true threat analysis.  Zero tolerance phi-
losophy and the push to identify future mass shooters before they
reveal themselves has brought true threat analysis into regular dis-
course about student’s creative activity.
The Bethel/Kuhlmeier standard, which is unique to schools, is
relaxed in comparison to the true threat analysis originally laid out
in Watts v. United States.61  Since 1969 Watts has been applied prima-
rily to threats made against the president, judges, police, and other
public figures,62 but also to prosecute stalkers and extortionists.63
This kind of speech is unprotected by the First Amendment,64 a
premise that forms the basis for state laws forbidding terroristic
58 See infra note 63.
59 “We have nonetheless recognized that the First Amendment rights of students
in the public schools are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in
other settings, and must be applied in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment.” Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 266 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 43 v. Fraser,
478 US 675, 682 (1986) and Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969)) (internal quotations omitted)).
60 See infra note 76.
61 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
62 See United States v. Schneider, 910 F.2d 1569, 1571 (7th Cir. 1990) (Judge of the
Illinois Circuit Court). See also United States v. Mitchell, 812 F.2d 1250, 1255 (9th Cir.
1987) (the President); Watts, 394 U.S. at 705 (the President).
63 True threat cases involving stalking include People v. Toledo, 26 P.3d 1051, 1053
(Cal. 2001), in which the defendant, during a fight that involved a lot of destruction
of property, told his girlfriend, “You know, death is going to become you tonight.  I
am going to kill you,” and then, holding scissors close to her neck, said “You don’t
want to die tonight, do you?  You’re not worth going to jail for,” and People v. Allen, 40
Cal. Rptr. 2d 7 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995), in which the defendant pointed a gun at the
victim and her daughter and threatened to kill them.  In United States v. Reynolds, the
court found a true threat where the defendant told the victim he was going to “drop
anthrax in your air conditioner.”  381 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2004).  For extortion, see
United States v. Nishnianidze, 342 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 2003); United States v. Morales, 272 F.3d
284 (5th Cir. 2001).
64 See, e.g., United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 1990).
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and criminal threats.  A threat is therefore construed as conduct
rather than speech.65
Interpretation of the Watts true threat analysis varies from cir-
cuit to circuit.  The First, Second, and Ninth Circuits have empha-
sized the foreseeable effect of the alleged threat by asking whether
the defendant reasonably should have foreseen that the listener
would interpret the statement as a threat.66  The Ninth Circuit ex-
plained this standard in United States v. Kelner by clarifying that
speech could be regulated “[s]o long as the threat, on its face and
in the circumstances in which it was made is so unequivocal, un-
conditional, immediate and specific as to the person threatened,
that they convey the gravity of purpose and imminent prospect of
execution.”67  Conversely, the Fourth Circuit, the Second Circuit
(in conflict with itself),68 and the Seventh Circuit have examined
whether “the recipient could reasonably have regarded the defen-
dant’s statement as a threat.”69  Both tests require the examination
of the totality of the circumstances in which the alleged threat was
made.70
In the school context, the tests yield significantly different
results for students and teachers.  Under the Kelner/Fulmer test,
which looks at whether or not the recipient’s interpretation of the
statement as a threat was reasonable, a court would examine
whether it is reasonable for a teacher to interpret a student’s draw-
ings as a real threat to cause harm.71  Conversely, the Schneider/
Malik/Maisonet test examines whether the recipient’s perception of
the statement as a real threat was reasonably foreseeable and holds
the student accountable for the teacher’s reaction to his or her
artwork.72
65 See Watts, 394 U.S. at 707.
66 See Fulmer v. United States, 108 F.3d 1486 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Kel-
ner, 534 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1976); Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d at 1262.
67 Kelner, 534 F.2d at 1027.
68 United States v. Sovie, 122 F.3d 122, 125 (2d Cir. 1997).
69 United States v. Schneider, 910 F.2d 1569, 1570 (7th Cir. 1990). See also United
States v. Malik, 16 F.3d 45, 48 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Maisonet, 484 F.2d
1356, 1358 (4th Cir. 1973).
70 See Fulmer, 108 F.3d at 1494; Watts, 394 U.S. at 707.  This emphasis on context
means that the reliance on “in the wake of Columbine” evidence is crucial to Courts’
analysis of an alleged threat – both in the Fulmer and Watts context.  If the context is
that schools are dangerous places, and students are dangerous people, the courts’
analysis about both intent to threaten and whether a student may reasonably foresee
that a teacher would interpret a drawing as a real threat of harm favors school
administrators.
71 See Commonwealth v. Milo M., 740 N.E.2d 967, 970 (D. Mass. 2001).
72 See Demers v. Leominster Sch. Dep’t, 263 F. Supp. 2d 195, 202 (D. Mass 2003).
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In conjunction with the reliance on the Kelner/Fulmer 73 true
threat cases, courts evaluating school treatment of artwork as threat
rely heavily on the Ninth Circuit decision Karp v. Becken.74  To jus-
tify school disciplinary action based on artwork, Karp takes a nar-
row view of Tinker, focusing on the language in Tinker which allows
school officials to act upon a “forecast of disruption.” Karp re-
quires school officials “to prevent the occurrence of distur-
bances,”75 rather than to consider whether the act at issue was a
substantial disturbance.
The application of true threat analysis to the school environ-
ment has serious ramifications for student speech in public
schools.  Unlike Bethel and Kuhlmeier, which both remain grounded
in the school’s “pursuit of the basic educational mission” as the
important government interest justifying censorship of student
speech, true threat analysis is based on the prevention of danger
and violence in the school setting.  True threat analysis shifts the
context of the analysis of student speech from an academic or edu-
cational mission to school safety and discipline.  If, as Kuhlmeier em-
phasizes, schools really do train participants in democracy, the
trend toward suppressing student creative expression through such
a serious legal test is particularly worrisome.
More specifically, by applying the true threat analysis to stu-
dent creative speech—poems, stories, and drawings—courts and
administrators have expanded the realm of punishable student
speech to include artistic expression.  Such creative speech is an
especially valuable form of non-verbal expression for children, es-
pecially those at risk for a variety of negative behaviors associated
with poverty, including drug use, delinquency, truancy, and gang
violence.  A brief overview of the most recent cases involving sus-
pension and adjudication in juvenile court illuminates this dis-
turbing new restriction on student creative expression in public
schools.
III. THE CREATIVE EXPRESSION CASES
Courts in various jurisdictions have issued conflicting deci-
sions on whether student artwork expressing violent emotions is
73 See Fulmer, 108 F.3d at 1494.
74 See Karp v. Becken, 477 F.2d 171, 174 (9th Cir. 1973) (upholding a student’s
constitutional right to attempt to distribute signs during a school walkout protesting
the firing of an English teacher, but affirming the school’s right to take the signs away
if they forecast a potential substantial disruption).
75 Id. at 175.
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protected by the First Amendment.  The cases are of two kinds:
(1) civil rights cases in which students have brought actions alleg-
ing that their First Amendment Rights have been violated by inter-
nal school disciplinary actions in response to their artwork, and
(2) cases seeking to overturn delinquency adjudications which are
based on artwork that is violent in content.  These cases share a
common theme.  They treat artwork as an undertaking that is ac-
tive and public enough to potentially cause a substantial distur-
bance to the school environment or actual physical injury.
Certain circumstances are particularly relevant to school-cen-
tered First Amendment jurisprudence.  Courts pay particular atten-
tion to the location where the artwork/writing was created, and at
whose bidding it was created.  For example, a poem written by a
student independently at home and then brought to school will be
approached with more suspicion than a poem written as a creative
writing assignment.76  Whether the piece is from a first-person per-
spective or a third-person narrative may also be relevant.  The
courts have examined whether the character who acted violently is
the student or a fictional character.77  In addition, the reality of the
events that take place in the artwork and the likelihood that they
could be realized is relevant.78  Finally, and most disturbingly, the
personal background of the child consistently factors heavily into
the analysis.79  Ultimately, the nature of the analysis reflects the
“terroristic threat” or “disorderly conduct” statute under which the
child has been accused.
The cases also vary notably in that some are premised on the
76 See generally In re Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d 725, 741 (Wis. 2001) (giving more
deference to writing in a creative writing class).
77 Id. (“[Douglas’s story] is written in the third person, with no mention of
Douglas.”).
78 The dissent in Douglas D. even goes so far as to note that a machete attack is
possible, and even a frequent form of violence, stating, “Inherent in the majority’s
analysis is the notion that the depiction of a machete in the story as opposed to a
firearm is too ‘creative’ to constitute a true threat.  Unfortunately, the reality is that
while this case was pending, a man attacked and injured nine people . . . with a ma-
chete.” Id. at 756 (Prosser J., dissenting).  The dissent then lists two other incidents of
machete violence, and adds a page long footnote that lists eleven newspaper articles
about machete violence. Id. at 757 n.13.  The dissent concludes, “The machete ap-
pears to be a particularly lurid weapon for inflicting injury.  In short, there is no rea-
son to dismiss the seriousness of the threat merely because it involves use of a
machete.” Id. at 757.
79 This may be most striking in LaVine v. Blaine School District, 257 F.3d 981, 984
(9th Cir. 2001), in which the court openly discusses information James shared with
the school therapist including his suicidal thoughts, an incident in which his dad
threw a rock at him, as well as a recent break-up with a girlfriend and allegations by
her parents that James was stalking her.
2005]SHEDDING YOUR SOUL AT THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE 141
school’s internal disciplinary actions, whereas others challenge the
involvement of the juvenile justice system in disciplinary action.  Ei-
ther punishment, when imposed upon a student for creative ex-
pression, has dangerous consequences for students’ First
Amendment rights.
Because these cases are principally about artwork, this Article
will group them according to artistic medium.  The students in La-
Vine v. Blaine School District,80 In re George T.,81 and In re Douglas D.82
wrote poems that school officials believed to be threats. In re Ryan
D.,83 Commonwealth v. Milo M.,84 Demers v. Leominster School Depart-
ment,85 and Porter v. Ascension Parish School Board 86 involve student
drawings and paintings that caused serious alarm.
The cases that involve poetry form a cohesive group, within
which there is some variation in poem tone and school disciplinary
action. In re George T. and LaVine are the most similar because the
defendants in both cases were teenage boys, the poems were
brought to school voluntarily, and both poems contained language
about bringing guns to school.87  However, James LaVine was
“emergency expelled” and then allowed to return to school after
counseling,88 whereas Julius, the defendant in George T., was adjudi-
cated delinquent for making criminal threats.89
80 257 F.3d 981, 981 (9th Cir. 2001).
81 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
82 626 N.W.2d 725 (Wis. 2001).
83 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 193 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
84 740 N.E.2d 967 (Mass. 2001).
85 263 F. Supp. 2d 195 (D. Mass. 2003).
86 301 F. Supp. 2d 576 (M.D. La. 2004).
87 George T., 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 367-70; LaVine, 257 F.3d at 983-86.
88 Id. at 985-86.
89 George T., 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 377. This decision was reversed on July 22, 2004
by the Supreme Court of California.  In re George T., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 61 (2004).  The
court relies on a five-prong test developed by People v. Toledo, which requires specific
intent that the statement be understood to be a threat. The elements are:
(1) that the defendant ‘willfully threaten[ed] to commit a crime which
will result in death or great bodily injury to another person,’ (2) that
the defendant made the threat ‘with the specific intent that the state-
ment . . . is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of actually
carrying it out,’ (3) that the threat—which may be ‘made verbally, in
writing, or by means of an electronic communication device’—was ‘on
its face and under the circumstances in which it [was] made . . . so
unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the
person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of
execution of the threat,’ (4) that the threat actually caused the person
threatened ‘to be in sustained fear for his or her own safety or for his or
her immediate family’s safety,’ and (5) that the threatened person’s fear
was ‘reasonabl[e]’ under the circumstances.
Id. at 67 (quoting Toledo, 26 Cal.4th at 227-228, and citing People v. Bolin, 18 Cal.4th
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Fifteen-year-old Julius was convicted by the San Francisco juve-
nile court of making two criminal threats and sentenced to one
hundred days in a juvenile detention center for handing his poem,
entitled Faces, to two young women at his new high school.90  Julius
first showed the poem to Mary S., who was in his honors English
class, and with whom his previous interactions had been limited to
brief conversations.91  He also gave a folded up copy of his poem to
another student named Erin S. while they were all standing in the
hallway.92  She only pretended to read it and put it in her pocket
where it remained forgotten.  However, Mary read the poem imme-
diately and believed it was a “death threat.”93  She gave the poem to
a teacher, and when Julius came to school the next Monday, the
police were waiting for him.94  The poem reads:
Faces
Who are these faces around me?
Where did they come from?
They would probably become the
next doctors or loirs or something. All
really intelligent and ahead in their
game.  I wish I had a choice on
what I want to be like they do.
All so happy and vagrant.  Each
origonal in their own way.  They
make me want to puke.  For I am
Dark, Destructive, & Dangerous.  I
slap on my face of happiness but
inside I am evil!!  For I can be
the next kid to bring guns to
kill students at school.  So Parents
watch your children cuz I’m BACK!!95
The note was signed, “by Julius AKA Angel.”  At the top of the page
he had written, “These poems describe me and my feelings.  Tell
me if they describe you and your feelings.”96
Julius testified that he wrote Faces because he was having a bad
day and that writing the poem was the only way for him to get those
297, 337-340 (1998)). Although the Court of Appeals has been recently overruled,
this analysis and the punishment are still relevant to demonstrate the type of thinking
and the structure courts apply to student expression cases.




94 Id. at 369.
95 Id. at 368.
96 Id. at 367.
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feelings out.97  He went on to say that this poem was the first one
he had ever written that mentioned killing of any kind, that usually
his poems were about angels, and that he never intended the poem
to be a threat.98  Julius also testified that he intended the poem as a
joke, and that he and his friends joked that they would be “the next
Columbine kid.”99
Despite this testimony, the Court of Appeals found that the
poem did not warrant First Amendment protection because it con-
stituted a “substantial and material disruption” under Tinker since
Julius intended the poem to be a criminal threat to his two class-
mates.100  The court made a strong connection between the lan-
guage about bringing guns to school and the testimony by Julius
and his friends that they joked about being “the next Columbine
kid.”101  It also emphasized that this was Julius’s third school, and
that he had a history of disruptive behavior.102  The Supreme Court
of California recently overturned this decision, ruling that Julius’s
poem was “too ambiguous” to be a threat, and that his criminal
conviction was inappropriate.103  The court did not address the
lower court’s analysis under Tinker regarding whether the poem
was truly a substantial disturbance.104  Like the court in Douglas D.,
the court emphasized that the poem warranted in-school punitive
measures in light of pervasive school violence.105
Like Julius, James LaVine, a high school junior, voluntarily
brought a poem to school.  However, in addition to sharing it with
97 Id. at 371.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 375-76.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 374.
103 In re George T., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 61 (Cal. 2004).
104 Id.
105 The court did not dispense with the Columbine-based understanding of the
school environment.  It stated, “This case implicates two apparently competing inter-
ests: a school administration’s interest in ensuring the safety of its students and faculty
versus students’ right to engage in creative expression.  Following Columbine, Santee,
and other notorious school shootings, there is a heightened sensitivity on school cam-
puses to latent signs that a student may undertake to bring guns to school and embark
on a shooting rampage.  Such signs may include violence-laden student writings. . . .
Minor’s reference to school shootings and his dissemination of his poem in close
proximity to the Santee school shooting no doubt reasonably heightened the school’s
concern that minor might emulate the actions of previous school shooters.  Certainly,
school personnel were amply justified in taking action following Mary’s e-mail and
telephone conversation with her English teacher.” Id. at 75.  The court also noted,
“For example, the two student killers in Columbine had written poems for their En-
glish classes containing ‘extremely violent imagery.’” Id.
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friends, James shared his poem, Last Words, with his English
teacher.106  James was “emergency expelled” from school for this
poem.107  James argued that his temporary emergency expulsion
based on the poem was content-based discrimination.  The school
countered by declaring the poem to be only one of a “confluence
of factors . . . that indicated he was a danger to the safety of the
school and to himself,” and therefore unprotected by the First
Amendment.108  The court agreed with the school.109  At the begin-
ning of its discussion, the court noted the violent climate of schools
and the struggle faced by school administrators “[a]fter Colum-
bine, Thurston, Santee and other school shootings.”110  In a bal-
ancing test of the student’s right to free speech and schools’ safety
concerns, the court found that the school had not acted in contra-
vention to James’ constitutional right to free speech by “emergency
expelling” him based in part on his poem.111  In light of the
school’s knowledge of the problems James was dealing with at
home, his past disciplinary problems, and a recent break-up with
his girlfriend that included allegations of stalking, the court held
that the school was within its rights to investigate James’s mental
state before allowing him to return to school.112  Under Tinker, the
court held that the poem forecasted a potential substantial disrup-
tion which justified the school’s actions.113  However, the court did
uphold a permanent injunction granted by the lower court that
prevented the school from recording the incident in James’s per-
manent file as it could cause unnecessary damage to his ability to
secure employment in the future.114
Thirteen-year-old Douglas was slightly different from Julius
and James in that he wrote his poem as part of an in-class English
assignment and submitted it to his teacher as required.115  The
piece, which led to Douglas’s conviction and placement under one
year of formal supervision for violating the Wisconsin disorderly
conduct statute, reads:
106 LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 984 (9th Cir. 2001).  For the text of
the poem, see the Introduction.
107 Id. at 985 n.3.  For a definition of emergency expulsion see supra, note 14.
108 Id. at 988.
109 Id. at 991.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 992.
112 Id. at 991.
113 Id. at 990.
114 Id. at 991.
115 In re Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d 725, 730 (Wis. 2001).
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There one lived an old ugly woman her name was Mrs. C
that stood for crab.
She was a mean old woman that would beat children
sencless.
I guess that’s why she became a teacher.
Well one day she kick a student out of her class and he din’t
like it.
That student was named Dick.
The next morning Dick came to class & in his coat he con-
seled a machedy.
When the teacher told him to shut up he whiped it out &
cut her head off.
When the sub came 2 days later she needed a paperclipp so
she opened the droor.
Ahh she screamed as she found Mrs. C’s head in the
droor.”116
The police pressed charges despite Douglas’s apology and his
assurance that he did not intend his story to be a threat.117  The
district court agreed that the piece was a threat, and therefore un-
protected by the First Amendment, because it caused a substantial
disturbance by upsetting his teacher, Mrs. C.118  The Court of Ap-
peals affirmed.119
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin disagreed, instead finding
that Douglas’s story did not rise to the level of a true threat because
it contained jest and hyperbole.120  Relying heavily on the fact that
Douglas wrote the story as an in-class assignment at the behest of
his teacher and that the story was written in the third person, the
court held that the piece itself was a work of fiction and was in-
tended as such.121  Throughout the opinion, the court took great
pains to emphasize its deference to school officials who take inter-
nal disciplinary action.122  The court noted that it “share[d] the
116 Id. at 730-31.
117 Id. at 731.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 741.  The court defines a true threat as, “a statement . . . as distinguished
from hyperbole, jest, innocuous talk, expressions of political views, or other similarly
protected speech.” Id. at 739 (citing State v. Perkins, 626 N.W.2d 762 (Wis. 2001)).
The court then decides that in the context of an English class creative writing assign-
ment, Douglas could not have made a true threat. Id. at 741.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 242. (“By no means should schools interpret this holding as undermining
their authority to utilize their internal disciplinary procedures to punish speech such
as Douglas’s story.”).
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public’s concern regarding threats of school violence.”123  It also
clearly stated that “[s]ociety need not tolerate true threats.”124
The cases involving painting and drawing share the analysis
and outcomes of the poetry cases.  With the exception of Ryan D,125
these cases reflect the underlying judicial consensus that the art-
work must be considered in light of a Columbine-based threat of
school violence.  Like the poetry cases, the circumstances in which
the drawings were created vary, as do the punishments which were
meted out.
The decision in In re Ryan D. was an appeal from Ryan’s prose-
cution in juvenile court under California’s criminal threat statute
which had resulted in his being adjudicated delinquent, made a
ward of the court, and placed on home probation for a painting he
turned in for an art class project.126  Ryan’s painting was a graphic
illustration of a young man shooting a female officer in the head,
complete with pieces of brains and skin flying from the wound.127
The officer in the painting wore the same badge number as a fe-
male peace officer who worked at the school and had cited Ryan
earlier in the semester for marijuana possession.128  Ryan’s art
teacher took the painting to a school administrator who contacted
the authorities.129
Ryan repeatedly stated that he painted the picture to express
his anger at Officer McPhail for citing him for marijuana posses-
sion and testified that he was simply “letting his anger out for get-
ting in trouble” and had no intent to scare anyone.130  The court
found that the painting lacked the “gravity of purpose” and the
“immediate prospect of the execution of a crime that would result
in death or great bodily injury to [Officer] McPhail.”131 It over-
turned the juvenile court’s decision to convict Ryan.132  In holding
that the painting fell below the high standard that would make it a
true threat, the court cited a variety of factors, including the sub-
mission of the painting as a class assignment, the month that had
passed between the incident that angered Ryan and the submission
of the painting, and the fact that Ryan could not have expected the
123 Id. at 743.
124 Id.
125 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 193 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
126 Id. at 195.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 196.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 197.
131 Id. at 199.
132 Id. at 202.
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Officer to see the painting.133  Most importantly, the court held
that the painting was too “ambiguous” to be a real threat, stating
that “[a]s an expression of intent, a painting—even a graphically
violent painting—is necessarily ambiguous,” whereas a criminal
threat “is a specific and narrow class of communication.”134
The judicial analysis in Porter v. Parish Ascension School Board 135
contrasts greatly to the analysis in Ryan D.  This is so even though
Adam, the student in Porter, was expelled from school rather than
arrested for his drawing.136  The case involved a drawing Adam
made two years earlier which his brother, Andrew, found in a
sketchbook that he brought to school without Adam’s permis-
sion.137  The drawing depicted
[the school] being soaked with gasoline surrounded by an indi-
vidual with a torch and a missile.  The drawing also depicted at
least two students holding what appeared to be guns and a stu-
dent throwing a brick at . . . Principal Conrad Braud, while say-
ing the words, ‘shut the f—- up faggot.’ A racially explicative
word was also written on the drawing.138
The drawing was confiscated by Andrew’s bus driver and
turned over to school administrators, who questioned Adam about
the drawing.  Due to the drawing’s content and Adam’s admission
that he drew it, his bag was searched, revealing other notebooks
carved with gang symbols and containing writings about drugs, sex,
and death, a fake ID, and a box cutter.  Adam was expelled and
arrested for “terrorizing” and illegal possession of a weapon.139
The Louisiana District Court explicitly recognized Columbine
and other school shootings as a “backdrop”140 for its decision.  It
rejected the plaintiff’s arguments that the drawing was created out
of school and that Adam never intended for it to be shown to any-
one or brought onto school grounds, and instead likened bringing
the drawing to school to a student bringing a gun to school.141  In
133 Id. at 200.
134 Id. (citing People v. Mirmirani, 636 P.2d 1130).
135 301 F. Supp. 2d 576 (M.D. La. 2004).
136 Id. at 580.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 580-81.
140 Id. at 583 (“Indeed, several of the opinions the Court relies on in this opinion
mention Columbine and similar incidents in upholding the actions taken by the
schools in other cases . . . . It is against this backdrop that this Court must now decide
if Adam Porter’s drawing is entitled to First Amendment protection.”).
141 Id. at 589 (“The Court has little doubt that bringing a gun from home and using
it as a threat at school would not be sanctioned because the gun was loaded at
home.”).
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affirming Adam’s punishment, the court conducted a two-part
analysis and held, first, that the drawing was not covered by Tinker
because it caused a substantial disruption to the educational pro-
cess, and second, that the drawing rose to the level of a true threat
because it caused the administration to fear that Adam would blow
up the school.142  The decision made no reference to Adam’s rea-
sons for drawing the picture, yet relied heavily on the fact that he
had a past disciplinary record.143
The Massachusetts Supreme Court also accepted the premise
that the events in Columbine should dictate the school’s approach
to discipline in Commonwealth v. Milo M.144  The court upheld
twelve-year-old Milo’s adjudication as delinquent for drawing a pic-
ture the court labeled a terroristic threat based on the following
events.145  As he waited for an appointment with the principal to
discuss disciplinary problems from the previous day, Milo drew a
picture of himself shooting his teacher, Mrs. F.146  This picture was
confiscated by a passing teacher, who immediately showed it to
Mrs. F.  Milo then drew a second picture, which was delivered to
Mrs. F. by another student after Milo asked, “Do you want to see
this one, too?”147  Technically, Milo was adjudicated delinquent for
making a terroristic threat based on the second drawing only and
the circumstances surrounding the delivery of the drawing to his
teacher.
The pictures were graphic.  In one, Milo aims a large gun at
Mrs. F.’s head as Mrs. F. says in a speech bubble, “Please don’t kill
me,” with the word “blood” written in large letters at her feet.  In
the other picture, Mrs. F. has urinated in her pants and sits on her
knees with her hands clasped in front of her as if begging for her
life.  Milo, who is smoking an enormous cigarette, holds a gun with
a banner reading, “Kill. Bang” to her head.148  The court found
that Milo’s drawing was a true threat, and that it was therefore un-
protected speech.149
Milo claimed on appeal that the judge’s ruling was premised
largely on Mrs. F.’s state of mind and did not adequately consider
142 Id. at 586, 588.
143 See id. at 587-88.
144 740 N.E.2d 967 (D. Mass. 2001).
145 Id. at 974.
146 The drawings can be found in Appendix A and B of the Court’s opinion. Id. at
976-77.  The drawings are also found appended to this article.
147 Id. at 969.
148 Milo M., 740 N.E.2d at 972.
149 Id. at 975.
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his subjective intent or the actual possibility that he could carry out
the threat.150  The Appeals Court disagreed, finding that the judge
had given appropriate weight to each element.151  After judicially
noticing “actual and potential violence in public schools,”152 the
court held that Milo’s personal delivery of the drawing and its con-
tent constituted a threat.  In addition, the court was careful to state
that a drawing could be a threat in and of itself, and discussed in
detail the content of the drawings as indicating intent to instill fear
in Mrs. F. and harm her.153
In Demers v. Leominster School Department, Michael A., like Milo,
drew two violent drawings that alarmed teachers and the school
administration.154  Fifteen-year-old Michael, who was classified as
having special needs, had been removed from class for his behav-
ior.155  He went to a classroom next door, where a teacher sug-
gested that he draw his feelings about being disciplined.156  In
response, Michael drew a two-sided picture.  The first side depicted
the school “surrounded by explosives, with students hanging out
the windows crying for help.”157  Michael indicated both the type
(“C-4”), and in one instance, the amount of explosives (“7 lbs.”).158
The other side had a picture of “Dr. Joseph Rappa, the Superinten-
dent of Schools, with a gun pointed at his head and explosives at
his feet.”159  The teacher who suggested that Michael make the
drawing gave it to the principal.160  The next day Michael wrote, “I
want to die,” and “I hate life,” repeatedly on a piece of paper and
then threw it away; the paper was rescued from the trash and given
to the principal.161
After a meeting with the principal, Michael was suspended un-
til a meeting could be held.162  The outcome of this meeting was
that Michael was allowed to return to school as long as he would do
his schoolwork, behave, and undergo a psychiatric evaluation.163
When Michael refused to attend the psychiatric evaluation, he was
150 Id. at 970.
151 Id.  The court did not explain the reasons for its holding.
152 Id. at 973.
153 Id. at 972.
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suspended for the remainder of the school year and referred to an
alternative placement.164  After a hearing at the Bureau of Special
Education, the school allowed Michael to return.165  Michael’s fa-
ther then filed a Section 1983 constitutional tort action alleging
that by suspending his son because of the drawing and the writings,
the school had violated his right to free speech.166
In its decision, the Demers court analyzed the issue under both
Tinker 167 and Watts 168 and decided that Tinker did not provide pro-
tection for the drawing because the speech at issue was not “silent
or passive.”169  It further held that under the Watts analysis Michael
could “reasonably have foreseen” that the teacher and school ad-
ministration would consider the drawing and the writing a threat
to school safety,170 and therefore, Michael was properly subjected
to expulsion based on his drawings.171  There was no discussion of
the fact that Michael was asked to share his feelings in a drawing.
Instead, the court deemed the facts in Demers analogous to another
case in which a girl’s verbal threat of physical harm to her guidance
counselor constituted a true threat.172
The commonalities between the students involved in these
creative expression cases are revealing.  All of the cases involve
teenage boys with histories of disciplinary and psychological
problems.  The art itself is relatively similar, depicting schools blow-
ing up and burning down, students aiming guns at or shooting
teachers and fellow students.  The pieces undeniably reflect a deep
desire for school to disappear, generally as a result of some act of
violence.  However, whether or not the expression of such a wish is
truly a threat is certainly questionable.  In fact, it is arguable
whether even the most graphic of these depictions of teen angst is
164 Id.
165 Id. at 200.
166 Id. at 198.
167 Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
168 Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969). See United States v. Kelner, 534
F.2d 1020, 1027 (2d Cir. 1976) (explaining the Watts holding to mean that the gov-
ernment must show that the speaker intended to make a true threat, one that on “its
face and in the circumstances in which it is made is so unequivocal, unconditional,
immediate, and specific as to the person threatened, that they convey the gravity and
purpose and imminent prospect of execution.”).
169 Demers, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 202 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508).
170 Id. at 202 (citing United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1491-92 (1st Cir.
1997)).
171 Id at 203.
172 Id. at 201 (citing Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 373 (9th Cir.
1996), in which a fifteen year old high school student told her guidance counselor, “I
am going to shoot you.”).
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so disruptive that it should be deprived of the protections provided
by Tinker, or so immediately threatening as to constitute a true
threat under Watts or Fulmer analysis.  However, the cases suggest
that as long as the work is analyzed in the wake of Columbine they
will be so construed.
If the artwork is considered from a standpoint which takes into
account the falsity of public perception regarding Columbine and
considers the nature of children’s artwork from a practical perspec-
tive, the common judicial perspective appears far less reasonable
than as presented in the majority of the opinions.
IV. COLUMBINE AS A FALSE PREMISE
Regardless of whether punishment of a student actually sur-
vives judicial scrutiny, each court considers the content of the stu-
dent’s artwork in the wake of Columbine under an assumption that
incidents of mass violence like the one that occurred at Columbine
High School are an ever-present reality in the daily life of every
student in every public school.  This judicial perception of public
schools provides the foundation for the entrance of the true threat
doctrine into the discourse surrounding student artwork, and ex-
pands the substantial disturbance doctrine such that its limits are
ultimately meaningless.  If the threat of danger in schools is height-
ened, the abrogation of student speech rights to protect students
from danger is justified.  Without the Columbine rationale, restrict-
ing student speech including artwork would likely appear to be a
gross overstepping of school disciplinary boundaries.
The courts’ perception of the school setting as inherently vio-
lent or peaceful is crucial to the outcome of the creative expression
cases because of the discretionary nature of the Tinker test, and the
heavy reliance on the listener’s perception of danger in the true
threat analysis.173  Practically speaking, it is much more likely that
judges will consider a drawing a true threat or an act of violence
that causes a “substantial disruption” when they fundamentally be-
lieve that schools are in constant danger of erupting into violence.
Only the court in Milo M. went so far as to judicially notice the fact
of school violence by stating that “such violent episodes are matters
of common knowledge, particularly within the teaching commu-
nity, and thus are ‘indisputably true.’”174  However, even when it is
not explicitly stated, the recognition of school violence as a fact of
173 See Watts, 394 U.S. at 708; Fulmer, 108 F.3d at 1491-92.
174 Commonwealth v. Milo M., 740 N.E.2d 967, 973 (D. Mass. 2001) (citations
omitted).
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everyday life in the nation’s public schools in the creative expres-
sion cases is akin to judicial notice.175  The universe in which courts
imagine student artwork to be created is a violent one.  Artwork,
therefore, takes on characteristics that it could not if the setting
was peaceful – it becomes a statement of intent rather than an ex-
pression of emotion.
What is striking about courts taking judicial notice of the fact
of school violence is that acts of violence in schools, especially ran-
dom, large-scale mass shootings like the one at Columbine High
School, are the rare exception, rather than the rule.  Examination
of school violence statistics reveals that the creative expression de-
cisions are grounded entirely on a counterfactual premise.  In re-
sponse to the events at Columbine High School, President Bill
Clinton directed Attorney General Janet Reno to compile a na-
tional school safety report.  The cover letter to that report testified
to the overall safety of American public schools, stating that “it is
important to remember that ninety percent of our schools are free
of serious, violent crime . . . . [O]ur schools are among the safest
places for students to be on a day-to-day basis.”176  The Department
of Justice’s most recent report on school safety echoes that letter,
indicating that children are safest at school.177
Not only are schools safe, but other more in-depth reports sug-
gest that school violence has actually been on the decline.  During
the 1998-1999 school year, the year that included the Columbine
shooting, the National School Safety Center reported that there
were 26 school-associated violent deaths.  This was a 40% decline
from the previous year.  With 52 million students in America’s
schools, students that year had a one in two million chance of dy-
ing from school violence.178  The Center for Disease Control re-
ported that between 1993 and 1997 the number of students who
brought guns to school dropped by 25 percent.  Further, a joint
study by the Bureau of Justice Statistics and National Center for
Education Statistics found that between 1993 and 1997, the num-
175 Federal Rule of Evidence 201 allows courts to take judicial notice of certain
facts.  The rule states, “A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable
dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the
trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Id.
176 Letter from Secretary Richard W. Riley, Secretary of Education and Janet Reno,
Attorney General, to William Clinton, President, Cover Letter for 1998 Annual Report
on School Safety (Oct. 1998), available at www.ed.gov/pubs/AnnSchoolRept98/Let-
ter.html.
177 See Nation’s School Crime Rate Continues to Decline, supra note 17.
178 School House Hype, supra note 34.
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ber of school crimes declined 29 percent, the number of serious
violent crimes declined 34 percent, the number of violent crimes
(including fighting) declined 27 percent, and the number of thefts
declined 29 percent.179  In a survey by Metropolitan Life, 86 per-
cent of teachers and 89 percent of students and law enforcement
officials surveyed said that they thought their local schools were
safe.180
The stark contrast between the statistics and public perception
regarding the overall safety of public schools is probably due to the
extensive media coverage of the Columbine incident.181  A Justice
Policy Institute article, School House Hype, reports:
A phone poll of 1,004 adults for The Wall Street Journal and
NBC News revealed that 71% of Americans thought it was likely
that a school shooting could happen in their community.  A
Washington Post poll conducted seven months after the tragic
shootings at Columbine High School revealed that 60% of re-
spondents reported school violence as an issue that ‘worried
them a great deal.’ According to two polls conducted by Gallup
for the USA Today, respondents were 49% more likely to be
fearful or schools in 1999 than in 1998.  Polls showed that rural
parents were the most fearful of school violence, even though
the overwhelming majority of serious crime against or by youth
occurs in cities.182
The courts have fashioned a legal fiction from this public percep-
tion, choosing to ignore the government’s hard statistical evidence
that schools are safe.  This fiction lives past the immediate after-
math of Columbine in the late 1990s and pervades public thinking
about schools in decisions written as recently as 2004.  School vio-
lence is the language of the creative expression cases, regardless of
the outcome.
The court in Douglas D., which ultimately found in Douglas’s
favor, set the case in the wake of Columbine, stating “[s]chool vio-
lence is all too prevalent in our schools today. . . .  [T]he threat of
violence intrudes our children’s places of learning . . . .  Our chil-
dren consequently often must live in an environment of fear.”183
The LaVine court stated unequivocally, “[a]s we noted at the outset,
we live in a time when school violence is an unfortunate reality that





183 In re Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d 725, 737 (Wis. 2001).
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spate of school shootings have put our nation on edge and have
focused attention on what school officials, law enforcement and
others can do or could have done to prevent these kinds of trage-
dies.”184  The court in Demers explicitly relied on this premise to
justify its legal conclusion, writing “a reasonable interpretation of
the law would allow a school official to prevent potential disorder
or disruption to school safety, particularly in the wake of increased
school violence across the country.”185  Similarly, the court in Porter
used the Columbine premise as its entire legal context, explaining
In determining whether this drawing is entitled to the first
amendment protections claimed by the plaintiff, it is necessary
to review certain events which preceded the defendant’s actions
. . . [T]he most notable story was Columbine High School in
April 1999 . . . [S]ome schools became like war zones . . . It is
against this backdrop that this court must decide whether Adam
Porter’s drawing is entitled to Constitutional protection.186
School House Hype’s thesis that the media attention surround-
ing Columbine created an enormous disparity between the truth
and public perception is reflected in the fact that the sources for
judicial information on school violence are primarily television and
newspaper reports.187  The decision in Milo M. states, “[G]iven the
recent, highly publicized school-related shootings by students, we
take judicial notice of the actual and potential violence in the pub-
lic schools . . . . [J]udges cannot ignore what everybody else knows:
violence and the threat of violence are present in the public
schools.”188  The court supports this statement with a litany of
school shootings in a page-long footnote that cites most dramati-
cally ABC News, An Explosion of Violence as a primary source.189  The
dissent in Douglas D. footnotes an article entitled Scorecard of Hatred
184 LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 2001).
185 Demers v. Leominster Sch. Dep’t, 263 F. Supp. 2d 195, 203 (D. Mass. 2003).
186 Porter ex rel. LeBlanc v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 301 F. Supp. 2d 576, 583
(M.D. La. 2004).
187 School House Hype, supra note 34.  The U.S. Dept. of Justice agrees, stating in The
School Shooter: A Threat Assessment Perspective, “Though school shootings are extensively
covered in the news media, the information available in news reports is not necessarily
complete, accurate, or balanced.  News coverage is inherently hasty and often relies
on sources who themselves have incomplete or inaccurate information.  And journal-
ists ordinarily do not have access to police and other investigative reports that may
contain highly significant but confidential information about a school shooting inci-
dent or about the background, previous activities, and traits of the student or students
who carried out the shooting.” O’TOOLE, supra note 21.
188 Commonwealth v. Milo M., 740 N.E.2d 967, 973 (D. Mass. 2001) (internal quo-
tations and citations omitted).
189 Id. at 973-74 n.8 (citing ABC News, An Explosion of Violence (Mar. 28, 2002)).
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from Time Magazine which examined post-Columbine “incidents of
violence or potential violence” to support the thesis that schools
are dangerous.190  Such explicit reliance on media-driven public
perception of school violence as the whole context of the court’s
decision about whether to afford First Amendment protection to
student artwork looks, feels, and functions like judicial notice.
Under the Federal Rule of Evidence 201(c) judges may indepen-
dently apply judicial notice to adjudicative facts at their discretion.
Yet, under the doctrine of judicial notice, courts must have an in-
controvertible basis for the notice.191  Perhaps that is why the deci-
sions do not explicitly notice school violence.  An alternative
possibility is all the more disturbing; judges may believe school vio-
lence is such a commonly understood reality that judicial notice is
unwarranted.
However, judges have a choice about the sources they follow
and the statistics they use.  This couching of the creative expression
cases in an atmosphere of constant fear is a conscious and active
judicial choice that creates a heightened sense of urgency about
student behavior and allows courts and schools to impose serious
legal restrictions on the First Amendment rights of children.
Courts readily adopt the myth of Columbine and consequently
place heavy emphasis on the prevention of future Columbines, de-
spite the fact that this kind of incident, though undeniably tragic,
is by nature isolated and extremely rare.  The legal effects of the
blanket acceptance of this premise even by the more liberal judges
are dangerous not only for the future of student speech, but poten-
tially for speech rights of all citizens.
V. THE CHILLING EFFECT ON STUDENT SPEECH
The chilling impact of the decisions described above is derived
from both the more technical legal effects of the importation of
new criminal doctrines into the school environment, including the
dangerous expansion of the “substantial disturbance” standard in
the Tinker doctrine, and the practical, visceral consequences both
for individual students and art in general.
190 Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d at 750 n.2 (Prosser, J. dissenting) (citing Amanda Bower,
Scorecard of Hatred, TIME. Mar. 19, 2001, at 31-32).
191 See 60 AM. JUR. 3d Proof of Facts §5 (2001) (“[J]udicial notice may only be taken
of facts as to which there can be no reasonable dispute.”).
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A. Creating Art is Not an Act of Violence: True Threat Doctrine in
School
True threat doctrine removes speech from the protection of
the First Amendment when a statement is so frightening and im-
mediate that it rises to the level of an actual physical threat.  The
application of this doctrine in the cases seeking to overturn delin-
quency verdicts and in challenges to internal school disciplinary
actions has immediate implications for student speech in the pre-
sent and for the speech rights of artists in the future.
The decisions that apply the true threat analysis to artwork
transform violent imagery and metaphor used in drawings, poems,
and stories into literal statements of intent to cause actual harm.192
Application of true threat doctrine shifts the focus of a school
speech analysis from consideration of whether the speech in ques-
tion has caused a substantial disturbance in the educational setting
to the metaphorical content of the speech itself and the student’s
ability to foresee the frightened reaction of a teacher or another
student to the speech.  Such a shift emphasizes the intent and pre-
dictive abilities of the individual student rather than the effect of
the student’s actions on the educational setting, and it gives
schools and juvenile court judges an incredible amount of power
over the content of student artwork.
The decisions about Adam and Michael’s drawings in Demers
and Porter illustrate how the true threat doctrine has been im-
ported into the First Amendment student speech analysis.193  In
both cases the true threat analysis is performed side by side with
Tinker’s substantial disruption analysis.194  Essentially, the use of the
true threat doctrine in conjunction with the substantial distur-
bance doctrine renders the substantial disturbance test moot.  If
artwork is so serious and so dangerous as to be a true threat, then
by its very nature it causes a substantial disturbance to the educa-
tional process under Tinker.
This reasoning is evident in the results of the student artwork
cases.  Adam and Michael’s drawings were adjudicated to be true
threats and the courts held that the schools’ disciplinary actions
were reasonable and appropriate in light of the threatening nature
192 Milo M., 740 N.E.2d at 972; Demers v. Leominster Sch. Dep’t, 263 F. Supp. 2d
195, 202-03 (D. Mass. 2003); Porter ex rel. LeBlanc v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 301 F.
Supp. 2d 576, 586-87 (M.D. La. 2004).
193 Demers, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 202-03; Porter, 301 F. Supp. 2d at 586-87.
194 Id.
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of the work.195 Milo M., George T., and Douglas D. provide a more
dramatic illustration of the application of true threat doctrine.
These students were sent to juvenile court as punishment for their
artwork and were adjudicated delinquent because the courts deter-
mined their artwork constituted violations of state disorderly con-
duct and criminal threat laws.196
The use of the true threat analysis places artwork within the
sphere of criminal conduct and outside of the protections of the
First Amendment.  As discussed above, there are two versions of
the true threat analysis.  When applied to student artwork, the use
of the Fulmer version of the true threat analysis is especially worri-
some.197  This version examines whether the threat-maker could
have reasonably foreseen the reaction of the listener without in-
quiring into the intent of the speaker or his or her ability to carry
out the threat.198  This analysis was used in Demers to conclude that
Michael’s drawing of the school surrounded by explosives and the
superintendent of schools at gunpoint in the foreground was a true
threat because Michael should reasonably have foreseen the fright-
ened reaction of a teacher.199
Unlike Fulmer, the Watts true threat test, considers both the
capability and the intent of the speaker.  Unfortunately, it does not
necessarily produce a more positive result.  For example, in Milo
M., the court found that Milo had both the intent and the ability to
carry out the threat it found in the pictures he drew of himself
holding a gun to his teacher’s head.  The court found that “the
content of both drawings” evidenced his intent to shoot his
teacher.200  Additionally, the court held that the ability to carry out
the threat could be inferred from “circumstantial evidence:” Milo
seemed angry when he held the drawings out to Mrs. F. and he had
been disciplined prior to creating the drawings.201  Under a some-
what different interpretation in Porter, the court concluded that
Adam’s drawing of the school on fire and surrounded by bombs
was a true threat simply because the recipients of the threat could
reasonably have believed that he intended the drawing as a
195 Demers, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 202-3; Porter, 301 F. Supp. 2d at 599.
196 Milo M., 740 N.E.2d. at 969; In re George T., 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364, 366 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2003); In re Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d 725, 730 (Wis. 2001)
197 United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1491-92 (1st Cir. 1997).
198 Id.
199 Demers, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 202.
200 Milo M., 740 N.E.2d at 972.
201 Id.
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threat.202
The same court analogized Adam’s drawing to a loaded gun,
stating:
The Court has little doubt that bringing a gun from home and
using it as a threat at school would not be sanctioned because
the gun was loaded at home.  The same can be said of the draw-
ing.  The key issue is whether the school administrators or stu-
dents perceived the drawing (or gun) as a threat to their safety
and security . . .203
This loaded gun/violent artwork parallel is an excellent example
of the impact of true threat analysis on students.  The true threat
analysis should not be applicable to student artwork because even
student art is entitled to First Amendment protection.  Constitu-
tional arguments aside, the true threat analysis cannot be appropri-
ately applied to teenage students.
Both the intent and reasonably foreseeable frameworks of
analysis derived from Watts and construed in Schneider/Malik/
Maisonet and Kelner/Fulmer attribute adult developmental capacity
to teenagers.204  These frameworks place a heavy emphasis on the
content of the artwork.205  This emphasis contradicts psychological
research about the extent to which a child’s art expresses literal
meaning.  Given the power imbalances between students and
teachers, it seems unlikely that a teacher would find a student’s
artwork frightening enough to believe that it communicated an in-
tent to cause real harm.206
The true threat analysis’s emphasis on the student’s ability to
reasonably foresee a teacher’s reaction to a drawing places an adult
burden on a child.  It is questionable whether a student would ever
believe that a drawing could put a teacher in fear of imminent
physical harm.  The true threat analysis is particularly adult-ori-
ented in that it fails to recognize that children and teenagers have
202 Porter ex rel. LeBlanc v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 301 F. Supp. 2d 576, 587
(M.D. La. 2004).
203 Id. at 589.
204 See supra Section I.
205 See In re George T., 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364, 375-76 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (rev’d 93
P.3d 1007 (Cal. 2004)), in which the court emphasizes the fact that the poem talked
about bringing guns to school.  See also the court’s extensive description of the con-
tent of the drawing in Commonwealth v. Milo M., 740 N.E. 2d 967, 972 (Mass. 2001),
and its assertion that a drawing can be a threat.
206 See CLAIRE GOLOMB, THE CHILD’S CREATION OF A PICTORIAL WORLD 165-66 (2d
ed. 2004) (“The fantasy dimension of pictorial expression may diminish the intensity
of emotional conflicts that are particularly painful because of the child’s dependency
on adults and her powerlessness vis a` vis them.”).
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a reduced sense of consequence and foresight.207  Such an ap-
proach also particularly implicates students who have a history of
behavior problems, or who, like Michael, have an actual behavior
disorder, because they may be particularly unable to predict reac-
tions and to control their own behavior, as the true threat analysis
requires.
More importantly, the true threat analysis acknowledges that
what appears to be a true threat may actually be intended as politi-
cal hyperbole, metaphor, or jest.208  Art itself may simply be too
vague and ambiguous to constitute a true threat in the legal sense.
A child’s artwork is especially unlikely to be indicative of a specific
intent to act in a certain way.  Even analysts who specialize in the
meaning and diagnostic value of child artwork caution against un-
derstanding a child’s art as a literal translation of internal thought
or feeling.  For example, Claire Golomb, author of The Child’s Crea-
tion of a Pictorial World, states, “I have cautioned against using draw-
ings as if they were an X-ray of the child’s heart and mind.”209  If a
psychoanalyst is unsure as to the exact meaning of a child’s art-
work, surely a judge is not equipped to determine whether a piece
of art is indicative of criminal intent.
Aside from the many reasons that it is unfair to treat student
artwork as a true threat, there is real danger that the true threat
analysis may become applicable to all art.  True threat analysis indi-
207 See Marty Beyer, Recognizing the Child in the Delinquent, 7-SUM KY. CHILD. RTS. J.
16, 2-3 (1999). Beyer examines why adult criminal standards do not apply to the child
offender.  In her review of modern adolescent psychology, she emphasizes that ado-
lescents have different thought processes, which are more immature and less
nuanced, than those of an adult.  Beyer identifies four major characteristics that sepa-
rate adolescent from adult cognitive thinking: 1) not anticipating, 2) reacting to per-
ceived threat, 3) minimizing danger, and 4) having only one choice.  In the context
of true threat analysis, these factors lend credence to the argument that teenagers
may not conceive of the future consequences of their actions.  Because of this, the
true threat analysis should not be applied to teenagers’ behavior.
208 Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969).  Robert Watts stated, “They always
holler at us to get an education. And now I have already received my draft classifica-
tion as 1-A and I have got to report for my physical this Monday coming. I am not
going.  If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is
[Lyndon B. Johnson]. . . . They are not going to make me kill my black brothers.” Id.
at 706.  The Supreme Court held he was not actually threatening to kill Johnson, but
rather was speaking in political hyperbole. Id. at 708.  If such a statement is protected
by the First Amendment because it is hyperbolic, why not a drawing made by a twelve
year old student?  The court in In re Ryan D., 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 193, 195-96 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2002) relied on this analogy, as did the dissent in In re George T., 126 Cal. Rptr.
2d 364, 380 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (Rushing, J., dissenting) rev’d, 93 P.3d 1007 (Cal.
2004)). The same reasoning formed the basis of the recent reversal of In re George T.,
93 P.3d 1007 (Cal. 2004).
209 GOLOMB, supra note 206, at 319.
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cates a shift in the Supreme Court’s art jurisprudence from analyz-
ing art as obscenity to analyzing art as threatening conduct.  The
role of art and artists in American society—to entertain, to ques-
tion the status quo, to provoke thought, to portray alternative per-
spectives, and to criticize—is jeopardized by the courts’ and school
administrators’ treatment of student artwork as a threat.210  If a
school is, as the Supreme Court insisted in Bethel, the locus of the
student’s moral development, and, as Tinker conceives it, a place
where students learn to communicate as a society, then treating
violent artwork as a crime in school threatens to re-form our future
society’s perception and treatment of art.211  The analogy between
artwork and a gun in Porter raises critical questions about how pre-
sent-day students will both create and evaluate artwork of the fu-
ture.  It implicates the development of young artists and their
work, as well as the role and value assigned to artwork when the
current generation of students matures into adults.
Censorship by schools undermines the goal of the First
Amendment: to create a society that values its freedom to express
discontent with the status quo and permits such expression
through an artistic medium.212 When students are censored for ex-
210 See Hurley v. Irish American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515
U.S. 557, 569 (1995), in which the court cautions against narrowing First Amendment
protection to speech which has a “particularized message” lest it exclude the, “un-
questionably shielded artwork of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Scho¨enberg, or
Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll,” all controversial, yet vital artists in their time. In
a case in which it found computer source code to be protected under the First
Amendment, the Sixth Circuit analogized the code to artwork, citing Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957), to emphasize that, “ ‘all ideas having even the slightest
redeeming social importance,’ including those concerning ‘the advancement of
truth, science, morality, and the arts’ have the full protection of the First Amend-
ment.”  Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 484 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Roth, 354 U.S. at
484).  When the courts decide that student artwork is a threat, they take away the
artwork’s First Amendment protection altogether, silencing the student’s expression.
If children are being trained in the morals and values of society in school, than it
follows logically that when a school treats creative expression as if it dangerous, stu-
dents will learn that viewpoint.  They will carry that viewpoint into their adult lives and
exercise it in their communities.  Art may lose its advocates and its message, its vitality,
will be jeopardized.
211 Courts have worried about the ramifications of limiting First Amendment pro-
tection of artwork before.  For example, the Second Circuit cautioned that a statute
banning artists from selling their work in public places, “raises concerns that an entire
medium of expression is being lost,” and held that the statute violated the artists’ First
Amendment rights.  Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 697, 699 (2d Cir. 1996).
212 Artwork has been deemed “a quintessential form of expression,” worthy of and
requiring First Amendment protections.  People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals
v. Giuliani, 105 F. Supp. 2d 294, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing Bery v. City of New York,
94 F.3d 689, 696 (2d Cir. 1996)). As the court in Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York
passionately expounded, “Should it be a prerequisite for art to be art, that the artist
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pressing anger with the first institution that they become part of,
the message is that expressing anger with the status quo is danger-
ous.  Students learn that certain metaphor and symbolism is inap-
propriate, which also potentially removes that symbolism and
metaphor from artistic discourse, narrowing the artistic perspec-
tive.  The fundamental lesson is that art that addresses sensitive
and disturbing topics is punishable and unacceptable to society
and the community as a whole.213
However, because of the ambiguous nature of art and the po-
tential for multiple interpretations of its meaning, students cannot
predict what kind of creative expression will get them in trouble.
Students punished for their artwork will learn quickly that art must
express his thoughts through traditional, perceptually accessible means?  The long
history of ideas, which records infamous instances of persecution of creative expres-
sion, would answer compellingly, for any society that values free speech as much as
ours, with an emphatic ‘No.’  Civilization has traveled too far down the road in the
evolution of art as embracing the whole spectrum of human imagination for the law
to countenance a classification of an artist’s design as art only when imparted in con-
ventional shapes and forms sufficiently familiar or acceptable to a government licen-
sor.”  Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York, 313 F. Supp. 2d 280, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
The court goes on to recognize clothing decorated with graffiti to convey “themes
and voices of underrepresented individuals and groups in a large urban environ-
ment” and deems this to be expression protected by the First Amendment, thus rec-
ognizing the right of the artist to sell them in public. Id. at 291.  Further emphasis on
the expressive power of art in society comes from Parks v. LaFace Records, 76 F. Supp.
2d 775, 780 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (citing Hicks v. Casa Blanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426,
430 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)), in which the court recognizes that artwork like books and mov-
ies, “are vehicles through which ideas and opinions are disseminated and, as such,
have enjoyed certain constitutional protections . . .”  Art is protected by the virtue of
its expressiveness, by the fact that it communicates the artist’s opinion.
213 The potential implications for the legal analysis of artwork under the true threat
doctrine is not reserved to students in public schools.  Just as schools have used secur-
ity as a justification for chilling student speech in the wake of Columbine, so has the
federal government used security as justification for the narrowing of various civil
rights by the Patriot Act, which has ramifications for the art world as a whole both in
the present and the future.  The  FCC’s recent actions censoring speech on the radio,
the destruction of puppets and banners created for anti-war and anti-WTO protests
for fabricated security reasons, and the increased permission for law enforcement to
wiretap and monitor left wing political groups under the Patriot Act lend validity to
this fear. See generally David Graeber, Lying in Wait, THE NATION, Apr. 19, 2004, at 18,
available at www.thenation.com/doc/hmtml?i=20040419&s=graeber.
It is possible that the expansion of the true threat analysis from stalking, harassment,
and cross burning to student artwork heralds the possibility of applying this analysis to
adult paintings, movies, and media.  The national security and school security uni-
verses collided recently when the secret service questioned a student in Prosser, Wash-
ington after he drew a picture for an art class journal assignment depicting a man in
Middle Eastern-style clothing holding a rifle in one hand and George W. Bush’s head
on a stick in the other, captioned with a call for the end of the war in Iraq. See
Associated Press, Secret Service Questions Students on Drawings (Apr. 27, 2004), available
at http://www.refuseandresist.org/police_state/art.php?aid=1334.
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be both safe and benign in order to be socially acceptable.  The
savvy student will suppress or self-censor all school-sponsored crea-
tive expression.  Public school may therefore silence the student
artists who would grow up to be the adult artists, thereby stifling
those who provide the introspection and social commentary which
is key to our society.  As eloquently illustrated by the dissent in In re
George T., some of the most important and powerful poetry of our
time is rife with violent images.214  These cases represent a trend
toward censorship of our society’s future artists before they can
truly begin to develop.
The court in Douglas D. stated that “we cannot imagine how a
student threatening a teacher could not be deemed conduct that
tends to menace, disrupt, and destroy public order.”215  This state-
ment contradicts recent statistics regarding teachers and safety,216
and inappropriately implies that teachers’ fear of their students jus-
tifies nearly unbounded reign over their speech.  Such deference
to a teacher’s emotions creates a new definition of substantial dis-
ruption that focuses more on the effect on the teacher’s feelings
than on the effect on the actual educational process.
Although the court ultimately found that Douglas D.’s criminal
conviction was improper because his drawing was not a true threat,
it relied on Tinker to decide that the school officials acted properly
when they disciplined George for his drawing.217 LaVine, George T.,
and Porter are in alignment with Douglas D.  In each of these cases,
the court found that the student’s artwork was unprotected by the
Tinker doctrine because it was threatening, and therefore that
school administrators were justified in meting out punishment.218
214 In re George T., 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364, 382 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (Rushing, J.,
dissenting).  This dissent cites passages of Allen Ginsburg’s “Howl” and Lowell’s
“Skunk Hour,” and also mentions the work of Sylvia Plath and John Berryman. Fur-
ther, violent artwork is protected by the First Amendment.  The court in Video Software
Dealers Ass’n v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1185 (W.D. Wash. 2004), holding that
graphically violent video games are protected speech stated:
The same cannot be said for depictions of violence [as can be said
about obscenity]: such depictions have been used in literature, art, and
the media to convey important messages throughout our history, and
there is no indication that such expressions have ever been excluded
from the protections of the First Amendment or subject to government
regulation. The Court declines defendants’ invitation to expand the
narrowly-defined obscenity exception to include graphic depictions of
violence.
215 In re Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d 725, 738 (Wis. 2001).
216 School House Hype, supra note 34.
217 Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d at 741-43.
218 See LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2001); In re George
T.,126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364, 377 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003); Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d at 743
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Teachers and administrators already have a significant amount
of control over discipline and policy.  This discretion is granted
them by student speech cases in the tradition of Tinker, Bethel, and
Kuhlmeier.219  The court in LaVine relied on the restrictions placed
on Tinker by Karp 220 and Chandler,221 which emphasize school offi-
cials’ right to “forecast” a substantial disruption before one actually
occurs.222  Reliance on the myth of Columbine has further in-
creased the judicial deference to administrators’ decisions regard-
ing what student activities set off alarm bells.  The LaVine court
emphasizes this point in stating that the student’s poem was “filled
with imagery of violent death and suicide . . . . Taken together and
given the backdrop of actual school shootings, we hold that these
circumstances were sufficient to have led school authorities reason-
ably to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference
with school activities.”223  The court in Porter echoed this sentiment
when it “consider[ed] the nature of the drawings and similar
events at other schools that had resulted in tragic outcomes”224 in
finding Adam’s drawing to be a substantial disruption.  It is unclear
what the court meant by “similar events,” but it appeared to be
referring to the content of Adam’s drawing which depicted the
school on fire and students jumping from windows.225
The court in Douglas D. discusses Mrs. F.’s reaction to the
poem and her fear of this student extensively.  It even cites publi-
cized incidents of machete violence to support Mrs. F.’s claim that
she was truly afraid for her life.226  Even so, the court directs little
(“Under the circumstances in the present case, we hold that the school had more
than enough reason to discipline Douglas for the content of his story. . . . Although
the story is not a true threat, it is an offensive, crass insult to Mrs. C.”); Porter ex rel.
Leblanc v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 301 F. Supp. 2d 576, 588 (M.D. La. 2004).
219 Bethel v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986); Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 507 (1969); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
220 Karp v. Becken, 477 F.2d 171, 175 (9th Cir. 1973).
221 Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1992).
222 LaVine, 257 F.3d at 989.
223 Id. at 990.
224 Porter, 301 F. Supp. 2d at 588. See also Demers v. Leominster Sch. Dep’t, 263 F.
Supp. 2d 195, 203 (D. Mass. 2003) (“On these facts, a reasonable interpretation of the
law would allow a school official to prevent potential disorder or disruption to school
safety, particularly in the wake of increased violence across the country.”).
225 Porter, 301 F. Supp. 2d at 586.
226 Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d at 757-58 (“The machete appears to be a particularly
lurid weapon for inflicting injury.  In short, there is no reason to dismiss the serious-
ness of a threat merely because it involves use of a machete . . . . [T]his news story
[about machete violence] dispels the notion that a student could not conceal a
machete.”).
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attention to Douglas’s reasons for writing the poem.227  Such fac-
tors as the teacher’s knowledge of a student’s home life, the con-
tent of the drawing, and whether or not the child handed the
teacher the drawing are considered in Milo M., Douglas D., Porter,
and LaVine as integral to the school’s rationale that the writing and
artwork were frightening.228  These circumstances could easily be
considered in a different light.  In fact, they could be regarded as
indicators that a child is struggling—perhaps because of violence
at home, learning disabilities, or psychological issues that are not
being treated, and that some kind of therapeutic rather than judi-
cial intervention might be appropriate.  Instead, the doctrine per-
mits almost automatic curtailment of a student’s right to speak
when a teacher perceives a threat.
The courts fail to address alternative explanations, and instead
interpret disturbing poems or stories as conclusive evidence that
the student intended to harm himself or others.  This is an ex-
tremely punitive approach to student creative speech.  It uses the
emotional issues a child may have to convict that child.  In Douglas
D., the lower court heard evidence that the student apologized for
the poem and told school officials that he did not intend to
threaten his teacher.  Yet it approved his delinquency adjudication
anyway, citing the child’s history of behavior problems in school.229
Douglas’s apology did not protect him from the impact of his
poem. Rather, the juvenile court reasoned that if the teacher was
scared by his poem, the poem was a threat, and the student’s crea-
tive speech was unprotected.230  The court in Demers made a similar
judgment, finding that Michael’s drawing created fear among stu-
dents and teachers.231  The school and court did not evaluate the
student’s feelings and motivations, but rather placed the potential
fear of students and teachers ahead of students’ right to speak.
Increased judicial deference to schools and administrators “in
the wake of increased school violence” under the substantial dis-
ruption doctrine leaves the student whose rights have been violated
with little recourse or protection.232  This deference was aptly de-
scribed in Demers, when the judge, citing LaVine, stated, “We review
. . . with deference, schools’ decisions in connection with the safety
227 Id.
228 See Milo M., 740 N.E.2d at 969; Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d at 738; Porter, 301 F.
Supp. 2d at 588; LaVine, 257 F.3d at 990.
229 Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d 725, 731 (Wis. 2001).
230 Id.
231 Demers, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 202-03.
232 Id. at 203.
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of their students even when freedom of expression is involved.”233
The judge went on to say that “[g]iven the difficulty in balancing
safety concerns and free expression, I conclude that their actions
were reasonable.”234  Creative expression of emotion is vital artistic
speech, and even disturbing expression should not automatically
be curtailed when a teacher or school principal claims to be afraid.
As long as poems and artwork fall within the judicial definition
of substantial disruption, students remain vulnerable to random
and serious punishment.  The cases addressing such expression fo-
cus on the feelings of teachers and administrators, with little re-
gard to the students who created the artwork and poetry.  Courts
rubber stamp juvenile hall and expulsion for students whose ex-
pression may be a cry for help, not punishment.  If the courts want
to prevent another Columbine, this punitive approach is
counterproductive.
B. Student Artistic Speech is a Peaceful Method of Expressing Negative
Emotions
A mother whose 11-year-old daughter was suspended for three
days after drawing a picture of her teacher on a gallows with an
arrow through her head when she received a low grade on a quiz
told the local newspaper, “[s]he had done poorly on a test that was
handed back to her.  We’ve always told her that you can’t take your
feelings out on your teacher, so write about it or draw it as a cathar-
sis.”235  In Milo M., Douglas D., Ryan D., and Demers, the students
expressed frustration and anger with the school administration
and teachers through artwork and, as a result, faced criminal
charges or expulsion from school.  Harshly disciplining students
for expressing anger and frustration through a creative outlet has
three primary consequences: (1) it eliminates a crucial and thera-
peutic mode of expressing feelings, (2) it stifles a primary source of
emotional relief in the school environment, and (3) it prevents stu-
dents from receiving crucial constructive social feedback from
peers and teachers.
The cases about drawings present a variety of means through
which creative work depicting violence directed toward a school
was discovered by the administration.  They range from obvious
233 Id. (quoting LaVine, 257 F.3d at 992).
234 Id.
235 The Associated Press, Girl Doodles Her Way into 3-Day Suspension, May 5, 2002,
available at http://www.freedomforum.org/templates/document.asp?documentID=
16187&printerfriend.
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baiting by a teacher, as in Demers 236 where a teacher specifically
asked Michael to draw a picture of his feelings and then turned it
over to the principal; to accidental revelation, as in Porter,237 where
Adam brought a sketchbook containing the drawing to school and
showed it to other students; to Milo M., in which Milo handed a
drawing he spontaneously created to his teacher.238  The cases
about stories and poems demonstrate a similar range.  In Douglas
D., Douglas wrote his poem in response to an in-class assignment
and then turned it in,239 whereas Julius in In Re George T. wrote his
poem on his own time and shared it at school.240  What these works
of art share is that all of the artwork was created out of an emo-
tional reaction to something that occurred at school and depicted
scenarios occurring at school.  None of the students punished for
this violent artwork actually performed an act of physical violence
in the school setting.
It is highly possible that these students’ ability to express and
dissipate frustration and anger associated with school through art-
work was integral in preventing the feelings from escalating into
physical violence. Artwork can be a particularly powerful non-ver-
bal means through which children can express difficult emo-
tions.241  Teenage boys who have been exposed to violence face
particular challenges in expressing their feelings in a creative, non-
violent manner.242  However, social science and the foundational
research for art therapy demonstrate that it is worth the effort to
help children learn to channel emotions into artistic forms of ex-
pression.  Adolescents, especially, are at a crucial point in the de-
velopment of coping mechanisms and defenses.  The development
of “communicative” defenses during this stage is crucial to healthy
236 Demers, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 199.
237 Porter ex rel. LeBlanc v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 301 F. Supp. 2d 576, 580
(M.D. La. 2004).
238 Commonwealth v. Milo M., 740 N.E.2d 967, 969 (Mass. 2001).
239 In re Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d 725, 730 (Wis. 2001).
240 In re George T., 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364, 367 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
241 See GOLOMB, supra note 206, at 162 (describing how a child’s art fantasy world
provides, “an outlet for the expression of aggressive feelings in a socially acceptable
form. The shooting of enemy aliens, flame-throwing, and explosions are emotionally
charged themes that could be explored without risk . . . .”).
242 “For adolescents, the approach of the therapist needs to reflect their current life
experience.  Therefore, “talk therapy” tends not to be as effective as therapy that in-
volves activity or experience (such as experiential therapy, play therapy, and art ther-
apy).  These forms of therapy allow symbolic expression of internal conflicts.” 4
Troubled Teens, Adolescent Therapy: Current Trends in the Therapeutic Treatment of Ado-
lescents, at http://www.4troubledteens.com/adolescent-therapy.html (last visited Feb.
19, 2005).
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adulthood.243  Expression through art can be an excellent form of
non-verbal communication and a healthy way of coping with emo-
tions that allows the child to take control over the drawing’s sub-
ject.244  As Claire Golomb states, “[d]rawing and painting are
expressive statements about what one knows, feels, and wants to
understand.”245
The data and theory derived from the development of art
therapy offer enlightening insight into the benefits of art for chil-
dren.  Art therapy is guided by the basic tenet that the act of creat-
ing art is cathartic, healing, and therapeutic.246  More specifically,
the four primary aims shared by the many schools of art therapy247
illustrate why a student’s expression of negative emotions through
artwork should be encouraged rather than punished.  By process-
ing difficult emotions through art, an individual will experience
(1) catharsis, (2) integration/insight, (3) communication, and (4)
mastery.248  The expression and confrontation of emotions ex-
pressed through art releases blocked feelings; art allows its creator
to “see” confused emotions and gain insight and understanding
about their meaning; it allows a child to share feelings for which
they may not have language; and finally, the depiction of certain
feelings in artwork allows a child to master those emotions, to gain
some element of control over them.249
This experience of art is particularly promising for children
with behavior and anger management problems.250  “At risk” chil-
dren generally have the hardest time expressing their feelings, and
benefit the most by learning to channel ingrained violent reactions
into creative expression.  Art “gets it out.”251  It offers those who
create it a “way to gain distance from disturbing thoughts and feel-
ings.”252  It is an accepted and proven way that children, especially
243 MYRA F. LEVICK, THEY COULD NOT TALK AND SO THEY DREW 27 (1983).
244 GOLOMB, supra note 206, at 164.  “The act of drawing asserts control over the
objects represented; it is the power to make and unmake . . . ”
245 Id. at 164.
246 See LEVICK, supra note 243, at 9-10; GLYN V. THOMAS & ANGELE M.J. SILK, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHILDREN’S DRAWINGS 123 (1990).
247 THOMAS & SILK, supra note 246, at 124.
248 Id.
249 Id. at 124-25.
250 Myra Levick hypothesizes that when drawings made by children with behavior
problems are “accepted and valued by the art therapist/teacher [it] may be the first
step toward self-acceptance for that child.” LEVICK, supra note 243, at 10.
251 George Sanchez, Rising Eagle, Publique!, Mar. 22, 2004, available at http://www.
coav.org.br/publique/cgi, in which the author writes about the success of an art ther-
apy counseling program for gang-related youth in Salinas, California.
252 LEVICK, supra note 243, at 11.
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those at high risk, can learn to channel violent and angry behavior
into a socially acceptable form of expression.253  In fact, art therapy
can be more effective than verbal therapy for youth at risk, who
often have difficulty verbally expressing their emotions.254  It is “a
great channel for expressing feelings, including difficult feelings
like aggression, anger, and sadness.”255  Claire Golomb describes
this process more specifically in the results of her study in which
children drew pictures of “scary dreams.”256  She writes, “[t]he
threats that emanate from the child’s private nightmares, the
thoughts and images of punishment and of destruction that lock
her into her gloomy world, can become more manageable and sub-
ject to change once they find their concrete expression in a
drawing.”257
Should these difficult emotions remain unexpressed and con-
tained, they may eventually erupt dangerously or uncontrollably,
producing the exact result that school administrators seek to avoid:
a violent outburst.  William Pollack, an assistant professor of
clinical psychology at Harvard Medical School neatly summarized
this possibility, stating simply that “[s]ome boys who can’t cry, cry
bullets.”258
The teenage boys who were the subjects of the cases this paper
has examined are Pollack’s boys who “can’t cry.”259  They were all
considered high risk both because of their personal lives and poor
school disciplinary histories.260  However, Milo, Michael, James, Ju-
253 Brief of Amici Curiae Juvenile Law Center, et al, at 9, In Re George T, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 364 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003), available at http://www.jlc.org/Resources/pdfs/
george_t_amicus_brief.pdf (citing Udesky, Depression and Violence in Teens (2001)
http://www.ahealthyme.com/topic/depteen).
254 See id.
255 Anna Reyner, Ask Our Experts, at www.earlychildhood.com/commentary/ask/
ask_current.asp?ExpertID=175&QuestID=148&Count=20 (last visited Dec. 17, 2004).
256 GOLOMB, supra note 206, at 319-20.
257 Id. at 320.
258 Brief of Amici Curiae Juvenile Law Center, et al, at 8, In Re George T, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 364 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003), available at http://www.jlc.org/Resources/pdfs/
george_t_amicus_brief.pdf (citing Udesky, Depression and Violence in Teens (2001)),
http://www.ahealthyme.com/topic/depteen).
259 See id.
260 In Demers, Michael was actually diagnosed as having a behavior disorder for
which he was in special education.  Demers v. Leominster Sch. Dep’t, 263 F. Supp. 2d
195, 198 (D. Mass 2003). Julius in George T. was trying out his third high school.  In Re
George T., 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364, 374 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).  Milo M., as portrayed in
the decision, is characterized as having a “very angry demeanor and defiant manner”
toward the teacher; the decision references his “history” at school, noting that he was
generally considered a bad kid.  Massachusetts v. Milo M., 740 N.E.2d 967, 972 (Mass.
2001).  Adam, in Porter, had a reputation as a trouble-maker and gang member.
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lius, Douglas, and Ryan did the right thing – they expressed them-
selves through art rather than violence, reacting to anger in a
manner that most child psychologists would consider positive, even
healthy.  Yet, despite the research on the positive effects that all
forms of art have on children who are at high risk for violent be-
havior, the school administrators treated the boys as criminals, and
the courts condoned it.  The boys were treated as if they had come
into school with a gun, or assaulted a teacher.  The judge in Porter
even analogized Adam’s drawing to a loaded gun.261
It is undeniable that the artwork is violent in content.  Douglas
wrote a poem about chopping his teacher’s head off with a ma-
chete.262  Milo drew two pictures in which he aimed a gun at his
teacher as she begged for mercy.263  Michael drew the school in
flames, surrounded by explosives.264  James’s poem explores his
feeling of indifference after going to school and shooting all his
classmates.265  However, the psychological reasons for such violent
imagery form a much more positive image of the students and sug-
gest reasons that their artwork cannot be a real threat as under-
stood by the law.  For example, Claire Golomb’s study of children’s
drawings of scary dreams revealed that emotionally disturbed chil-
dren drew violent images depicting “harm of a more personal na-
ture to the child” in contrast to “normal” children who directed
the violence toward anonymous enemies.266  Children like Michael,
James, Douglas, or Ryan may simply be trying to re-gain control
over situations in which they feel powerless.
More simply, the drawings were created in reaction to events
at school that caused the students to feel angry and perhaps humil-
iated.  Noticing that Michael was upset that he had been removed
from class, the teacher who later turned his drawing in to the prin-
cipal asked him to draw what he was feeling—and he did.  He
wanted the school to be destroyed.  In fact, all three boys had been
removed from class and likely suffered from anger and humilia-
tion.  Milo asked for a piece of paper and made a drawing while he
Porter ex rel. LeBlanc v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 301 F. Supp. 2d 576, 580 (M.D. La.
2004).
261 Porter, 301 F. Supp. 2d at 589.
262 In re Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d 725, 731 (Wis. 2001).
263 Milo, 740 N.E.2d at 972.
264 Demers, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 200.
265 The poem reads, “When it was all over, 28 were, dead, and all I remember, was
not felling, any remorce, for I felt, I was, clensing my soul . . . ”  LaVine v. Blaine Sch.
Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 983-84 (9th Cir. 2001).
266 GOLOMB, supra note 206, at 319.
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waited to see the principal.267  Douglas used his in-class assignment
to tell his teacher he was angry.268  The decisions fail to consider
that the feelings that motivated these drawings could be natural
and normal reactions of anger and depression to events at school,
and that artistic expression of these emotions may be the most pos-
itive and peaceful outlet for such emotions.
The cases also fail to consider that the school setting encour-
ages the kind of suppression of emotion, through an the emphasis
on discipline and through the power dynamic between teachers
and students, which William Pollack considers to be dangerous be-
cause it prevents students from expressing difficult emotions.269
Acting out violently at school is not permitted, nor is yelling, swear-
ing, or other similar means of expressing anger and frustration.
Should school administrators and the courts desire to prevent such
acting out they might do well to consider art as an alternative.  Cre-
ating art is a silent, non-violent, non-disruptive form of expression
that is perfectly suited to the school environment.  Such a medium
also allows the release of feelings as they arise, thereby preventing
the aggregation of negative emotions into pure rage.
Communication with other students about expressive art is
also crucial to students’ social development.  Chilling student crea-
tive speech in school prevents students from receiving necessary
social feedback from their peers.  This seriously limits student dis-
course.  The Supreme Court in both Tinker and Bethel recognized
school as an institution that teaches children to become citizens.270
267 Commonwealth v. Milo M., 740 N.E.2d 967, 969 (Mass. 2001).
268 See Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d at 729.
269 ELAINE BATCHER, EMOTION IN THE CLASSROOM: A STUDY OF CHILDREN’S EXPERI-
ENCE 78, 80 (1981) (“It is apparent that children experience a whole array of emo-
tions about school life and that many of these might be seen as negative.  The
children’s negative attitudes emerge in emotional statements but more often in visible
reactions to events.  Even reactions, however, are controlled because children are of
the general belief that emotion is not a good thing.  The teacher also would rather
not have to deal with the emotions of children.”).
270 Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969) (“The Nation’s future
depends on leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas
which discovers truth ‘out of a multitude of tongues, rather than through any kind of
authoritative selection.’”) (citing Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603
(1967)). The Court in Tinker noted, “The principal use to which schools are dedi-
cated is to accommodate students during prescribed hours for the purpose of certain
types of activities.  Among those activities is personal intercommunication among the
students.  This is not only an inevitable part of the process of attending school; it is an
important part of the educational process.” Id.; Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 43 v. Fraser, 478
U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (“[T]he objectives of public education [are] the . . . ‘inculcation
of fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political sys-
tem.’”) (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979)).
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Censorship of student artwork undermines both Tinker’s concep-
tion of school as a “marketplace of ideas,”271 and Bethel’s assertion
that school provides the foundation for morals and civility.272  The
ultimate purpose of education is irrelevant in this context since the
censorship of student artwork undermines both conceptions of the
purpose of school.  Children naturally censure one another; they
help each other learn what is acceptable and unacceptable within a
given community.273  Their “experience of the classroom centers
on belonging, knowing, working/learning, and trying/failing.”274
Children also naturally test boundaries.275  Without a safe forum at
school in which to test ideas, children cannot negotiate with their
peers about what is acceptable, or what causes others fear or
anguish.
For example, in George T.  Julius was having a bad day and
wrote a poem to get his feelings out.276  He gave the poem to two
other students after writing on the top of the page, “[t]hese poems
describe me and my feelings.  Tell me if they describe you and your
feelings.”277  Giving the poem to Mary may have been misguided,
but it was clearly an attempt to seek a connection or find a com-
mon ground with other people his age.  Although in his testimony
Julius minimized the emotional nature of his poem by characteriz-
ing it as a joke, it is hard to deny that the poem and the circum-
stances around its delivery were Julius’s attempt to express himself
to another student.  If Mary’s reaction was to stay away from him,
or show the poem to a teacher who could initiate a discussion
about it, Julius would receive social feedback about the feelings he
expressed, and perhaps receive validation of his feelings.  In a mar-
ketplace, students learn through trial and error.  We must wonder
whether the prison has become a more apt metaphor than the
marketplace for our nation’s public schools.
C. Courts Fail to Recognize That Art is Art and That Children are
Children
Glaringly absent from most of the creative expression cases is
any meaningful discussion about the fact that what is alleged to be
271 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512 (citing Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603
(1967)).
272 See Bethel, 478 U.S. at 681.
273 BATCHER, supra note 269, at 71.
274 Id.
275 Id. at 57.
276 In re George T., 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364, 367 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
277 Id.
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a threat is actually artwork.  Instead, the analysis of the student
work is contained within the parameters of the true threat analysis,
or the greatly relaxed version of the substantial disturbance doc-
trine employed in conjunction with true threat.  The fact that art is
at stake is only cursorily discussed in the context of intent to
threaten.278  Likewise, the fact that art is at stake is brushed over
despite arguments, which Douglas and James LaVine both as-
serted, that prosecution for their poems was a form of content dis-
crimination.279  Douglas also attempted to soften the “message” of
his poem by pointing out that it was written in the third person
about a fictional character named Dick.280  However, that strategy
is really an evasion of the true threat analysis rather than an argu-
ment that this is art.  The failure to recognize his argument reflects
the fact that courts do not recognize children’s art as the kind of
artistic expression which commands First Amendment protec-
tion.281  Further, the myth of Columbine has created a feeling of
urgency about school safety that precludes a more rational assess-
ment of student behavior.  Succumbing to this false urgency, the
courts have failed to take the time to consider the true nature of
art itself, and how children function, ignoring an entire realm of
reasonable and realistic alternatives to the true threat analysis.
Perhaps judges find it easier to use the true threat analysis
than to evaluate the social and psychological factors that may moti-
vate a student to produce violent artwork.  Granted, judges are not
the appropriate interpreters of children’s artwork, and are un-
equipped to determine the meaning of a poem or drawing.  By
ignoring the true nature of children and the inherent ambiguities
in artwork, the true threat analysis causes more harm than good.
The analysis effectively ignores the deeper societal problems
arising from the saturation of our nation’s children in meaningless
violent imagery.  It ignores the simple fact that school is a student’s
278 See, e.g., George T., 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 377 (in which Julius argued that, “the
vehicle [of the threat] is a poem, not a statement of personal intent to do anything”).
279 LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 988 (2001); In re Douglas D., 626
N.W.2d 725, 731 (Wis. 2001).
280 Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d at 729 (“He contends that his story is a fictional third-
person creative writing assignment . . .”).
281 The First Amendment protects expressive communication, which has been in-
terpreted to include, as discussed earlier, “all ideas having even the slightest redeem-
ing social importance including . . . the advancement of truth, science, morality, and
arts.”  Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 484 (6th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).  It is
notable that while the courts do not accord children’s artwork the protection that is
presumably accorded to adult artwork, they do not hesitate to apply such strict adult-
behavior centered standards such as the true threat doctrine to their artwork.
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life context, and that the events at Columbine had a deep impact
on students attending public schools at the time the wave of school
shootings occurred.  It also demonizes children at risk who may
only be able to communicate their pain through symbolism.  Con-
sequently, rather than encouraging school administrators to create
effective mental health-centered solutions for students at risk who
may be issuing a cry for help through art, current legal doctrine
sanctions an easy solution to problem students, allowing schools to
eliminate them from the roster through suspension, expulsion,
and juvenile detention.
This section examines a variety of reasons that students create
violent artwork, using the specific symbolism and metaphor that so
alarms school officials.  It is impossible to discuss violent artwork
created by children without addressing the general culture of vio-
lence to which they are exposed.  However, rather than place
blame, it is important to develop a better understanding of how the
prevalence of violence in television, video games, the news media,
current events, and music has increased the likelihood that chil-
dren will use violent imagery to express themselves.
Whether it takes place in school or elsewhere, violence is part
of the American cultural language.  It is the basis of much of our
entertainment, including video games, and it is infused into popu-
lar music.  For many children, pictures of guns and explosives may
simply be the easiest and most accessible imagery to express anger
and frustration with school, and artwork the only viable vehicle for
such expression.
The role of television’s standardized violent visual imagery in a
child’s development of symbolism and metaphor should not be dis-
counted.  A variety of studies have revealed that television nega-
tively influences children’s ability to be independently creative.282
A study of middle-school students found a negative relationship be-
tween the “amount of television viewed and creativity.”283  More
specifically, studies have shown that a child’s high saturation in tel-
evision has direct effects on a child’s capacity to imagine both
storylines and visual depictions of such storylines, and can result in
the mimicry of visual images seen on television rather than the im-
aginative development of imagery.284  Television also reduces a
282 GORDON L. BERRY & JOY KEIKO ASAMEN, CHILDREN & TELEVISION: IMAGES IN A
CHANGING SOCIOCULTURAL WORLD 76-80.
283 Id. at 79.
284 Id. at 80-81.  A 1981 study conducted by Meringoff, Vibbert, Kelly, and Char
demonstrated that children who were shown visual images of a story and then asked
to draw their own images of the story created higher quality, but more imitative illus-
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child’s ability to conceive of alternative uses for everyday objects,
and the ability to develop fictional stories.285
It is therefore quite possible that the violent imagery of
schools blowing up and students shooting classmates and teachers
that has come to be associated with Columbine has a cultural deri-
vation, and is natural imagery for children to use to express anger
and frustration.  That the nation views Columbine as a symbol is
not exclusive to adults.  Children may have come to view Colum-
bine and its real life narrative as an archetype of teen angst.  Claire
Golomb explains this phenomenon, “The act of drawing becomes
a vehicle for the expression of personal fantasies that are embed-
ded in emotionally significant themes of a collective nature and
thus provide the means for participating in the shared imagery of
the youth culture.”286 For students like Julius, whose propensity to
joke with friends about being the next “Columbine kids” sealed his
fate with the judge.287  Columbine has provided students with an
actual name to associate with their anti-institutional feelings - the
anger and frustration that derive naturally from the institutional
setting and its social and disciplinary structure.
Of primary importance is that this cultural archetype existed
before real students breathed life into the fiction through large-
scale, random, and indiscriminate acts of violence in school.  In
fact, even before Columbine, school as the setting for huge and
frightening acts of violence was already well-established as a cul-
tural metaphor and archetype.  Pearl Jam’s video for the song “Jer-
emy,” in which a boy who was picked on by other kids opened fire
in his classroom, topped the MTV charts in the 1990s.288  More
trations.  Another study, conducted by Forsythe in 1970, found that children exposed
to television copied images from television, whereas those who listened to the radio
created images from their own imagination.
285 Id. at 79-80.
286 GOLOMB, supra note 206, at 161.
287 In re George T., 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364, 375 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (stating “the
juvenile Court could take into account the fact that Julius referred to killing in his
writing because he and his friends ‘kind of joke[d]’ about the Columbine killings,
saying, ‘Oh I’m going to be the next Columbine kid; I’m going to shoot everybody at
the school.’”).
288 Pearl Jam, Jeremy, on Ten (Sony Records 1990).  In the video, Jeremy, a boy of
about 12 in a Catholic school uniform enters his classroom and systematically guns
down all of his classmates.  The lyrics of the song are as follows:
at home and drawing pictures of mountain tops, with him on top
lemon yellow sun, arms raised in a v
and the dead lay in pools of maroon below
daddy didn’t give attention
to the fact that mommy didn’t care
king jeremy the wicked, ruled his world
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generally, numerous horror movies portray widespread death and
destruction in a high school setting, or profile a rage-filled teen
outcast who seeks vengeance against classmates and school staff.289
School forms an enormous part of a child’s life, which makes
it both the source of experiences and emotions, and a natural set-
ting for artistic depiction of those emotions.  Children spend up to
eight hours a day at school, and are largely at the mercy of the
rules and procedures of the school. Both the school and the
teacher are natural objects of attention.  Further, despite teachers’
prominence in children’s lives, children cannot communicate their
feelings to teachers in the same way that they might to their
mothers or fathers.  Considering the widespread exposure of chil-
dren to violence in the media, the ascendance of Columbine as a
cultural and legal metaphor for the violence of teen angst, and the
primacy of school in children’s lives, it makes sense that Milo,
Douglas, Julius, and Ryan used imagery of bombs and weapons in
school to express their anger.
The failure of courts to consider this background highlights
jeremy spoke in class today
jeremy spoke in class today
clearly i remember pickin’ on the boy
seemed a harmless little fuck
but we unleashed a lion
gnashed his teeth and bit the recess lady’s breast
how could i forget?
and he hit me with a surprise left
my jaw left hurtin’, dropped wide open
just like the day, like the day i heard
daddy didn’t give affection, no
and the boy was something that mommy wouldn’t wear
king jeremy the wicked, ruled his world
jeremy spoke in class today
jeremy spoke in class today
jeremy spoke in class today
try to forget this. . .try to forget this. . .
try to erase this. . .try to erase this. . .
from the blackboard. . .
jeremy spoke in class today
jeremy spoke in class today
jeremy spoke in, spoke in
jeremy spoke in, spoke in
jeremy spoke in class today. . .
(spoke in, spoke in. . .)
289 E.g., CARRIE (MGM Pictures 1974); NIGHTMARE ON ELM STREET (New Line
1984); HALLOWEEN 5: H20 (Anchor Bay Entertainment 1989); TEXAS CHAINSAW MAS-
SACRE (New Line 1974); JEEPERS CREEPERS (MGM 2001); HEATHERS (New World Ent.
1989); PROM NIGHT (Avco Embassy Pictures 1980); THE IN CROWD (Warner Bros.
2000).
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the way that courts focus on teachers and administrators when ap-
plying true threat analysis.  Despite the fact that Columbine in-
volved both teachers and students, and that more students were
killed in the incident than teachers, the courts placed heavy em-
phasis on teacher reaction rather than student reaction.  They also
failed to understand artwork that reflects such incidents as using a
kind of cultural archetype, or reacting to the impact of Columbine
and its companion incidents.290
VI. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
A. Student Creative Expression Should be Recognized as
Constitutionally Protected Speech
The courts need to return to the original Tinker analysis, which
treats school as a mini-marketplace of ideas and allows students to
express themselves as long as the expression does not cause a sub-
stantial disruption. Tinker’s affirmation of students’ First Amend-
ment rights to silently protest the Vietnam War by wearing black
armbands to school indicates the Court’s deep respect for student
speech.291  Currently, courts and school administrators are treating
artwork as a weapon, rather than as an armband.  Such an im-
balanced analogy needs to be replaced, and art should be recog-
nized as a protected vehicle of creative expression in the nation’s
public schools.  Like an armband, art and writing are forms of
peaceful, silent expression, and should be recognized as such as a
matter of law.  This First Amendment framework is far more appro-
priate than the threat analysis because it recognizes art as a pro-
tected vehicle of creative expression and takes into account jest,
hyperbole, and the possibility that speech is innocuous.292
If the courts persist in applying the true threat analysis to stu-
dent creative expression, then age, emotional development, and
the ambiguous and metaphorical meaning of children’s art should
be factors in the “context” and “totality of circumstances” consider-
ations central to the true threat analysis.  If a student’s home life
may be considered, then why not consider their basic psychological
makeup?
B. The Myth of Columbine High School Must be Dispelled
In order for courts to recognize student creative speech as
290 See GOLOMB, supra note 206, at 160-61.
291 Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
292 See Yorty v. Chandler, 13 Cal. App. 3d 467 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970).
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constitutionally protected speech, they need a new lens through
which to analyze the disciplinary issues that arise in schools.  The
artwork cases reflect the fact that zero tolerance policies have gone
too far and that courts have supported this increasingly authorita-
rian trend through reliance on the fiction of Columbine.  It is time
for the courts to begin relying on facts and not media-crafted fic-
tion.  If courts adopt a new perspective on schools that is student
and education centered, reform of current disciplinary practices is
possible.
C. Schools Need To Reform Their Culture and Re-structure Their
Disciplinary Policies
The creative expression cases demonstrate that school admin-
istrators have carried the zero tolerance mindset too far.  Ample
evidence suggests that a heavily punitive disciplinary structure in
the school environment creates an unhealthy climate that increases
the possibility of violence and has a variety of negative conse-
quences for students.293  It is highly recommended that schools
restructure the school setting to emphasize social, emotional, and
academic learning rather than discipline.294  U.S. Education Secre-
tary Richard W. Riley opposes the use of profiling, and instead as-
serts that the use of “compassion, discipline, and conflict
resolution” can prevent 80% of violent behavior.295  As one com-
mentator has noted, “[d]iscipline that is fair, corrective and in-
cludes therapeutic relationship-building with students reduces the
likelihood of further problems.”296  Zero tolerance should be aban-
doned in light of recent psychological studies and be replaced with
a holistic, child-centered approach to education.
The zero tolerance approach produces a variety of negative
outcomes for children.  One such outcome is that it has invited
schools and the courts to employ student profiles and lists of warn-
ing signs to pre-emptively discipline students they believe to be po-
tentially violent.297  Jennifer Brady suggests that profiling is
negative and results in false positives that hurt students.  She also
293 Brady, supra note 20.
294 Id.
295 Id.
296 Andrea Canter and Browning Wright, Challenging Behavior & Effective Discipline
for All Students: Best Practice Strategies for Educators, GUIDANCE CHANNEL EZINE, at http://
www.guidancechannel.com/default.aspx?M=a&index=662&cat=17 (last visited Feb.
23, 2005) [hereinafter Challenging Behavior].
297 As discussed infra, violent artwork has appeared on these lists.  Despite the fact
that the writer of the list of warning signs may caution against using it as a kind of
checklist for the violent student, it is apparent in the decisions that both schools and
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believes that the “[t]he potential of abuse is as great as the poten-
tial of violence.”298  She suggests that part of the reason that the
potential for abuse is so great is that there is no agreement among
experts as to which of these “warning signs” are actual predictors of
violence.299  Violent artwork and writing should not be deemed
warning signs, as art is a particularly unreliable indicator of future
violence and is fundamental to students’ rights to creative
expression.
Schools and the courts need to refuse to extend the automatic
punishment mechanism that characterizes zero tolerance to stu-
dent artwork and, more generally, to re-think their use of zero tol-
erance policies as the primary school diplomacy structure.  Zero
tolerance policies are proven to be ineffectual “in the long run,”
have resulted in an increase in school drop out rates, and are
proven to be susceptible to discriminatory application.300  Further,
the punishments meted out under zero tolerance policies are pri-
marily exclusionary—suspension and expulsion—which result in
isolation of the child from the social setting, increasing feelings of
isolation, and lost educational opportunity.  As one psychologist
states, “[t]here is no evidence that removing children from school
makes a positive contribution to school safety.”301  However, for
children who demonstrate anti-social behavior, the punishment ac-
tually increases the likelihood that a child will become delinquent
because removal results in a loss of the structure and supervision
provided by the school environment.302 Suspension and expulsion
exacerbate the risk that students will become dangerous after re-
ceiving such punishment.303
This risk is particularly relevant when student artwork is in-
volved.  Children who create artwork have non-violently expressed
emotions through artwork and should not face punitive measures
because such punishment may only deepen the hostile feelings
they have expressed.  The creative expression cases universally
sanction the use of internal school disciplinary action against the
students for their artwork, granting much deference to the choices
judges are taking a one-size fits all type of blanket approach to these warning signals.
See Brady, supra note 20.
298 Id.
299 Id.
300 See Challenging Behavior, supra note 296.
301 Russell Skiba et al., Zero Tolerance and Alternative Discipline Strategies, GUIDANCE
CHANNEL EZINE, at http://www.guidancechannel.com/default.aspx?M=A&index=
1581&cat=17 (last visited Feb. 23, 2005).
302 Id.
303 See Challenging Behavior, supra note 296.
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made by teachers and administrators as long as the juvenile court is
not involved.  This leaves students who are punished for creating
violent artwork without recourse to stand up for their First Amend-
ment rights.  It also precludes a judicial mandate requiring schools
to alter their approach to student creative expression.
D. Schools Can Address Violence Through Mental Health Based Non-
Violence Programs
The creative expression cases place the blame for both poten-
tial and actual school violence on students and absolve the schools
from making the necessary structural and policy-based changes
that could render school environments more academic, more stu-
dent-friendly, and ultimately safer. By allowing schools to mete out
serious punishment to students for artwork, the courts have ig-
nored the existence of alternative approaches that do not damage
student speech rights.
The failure of the courts to recognize the consequences of
sanctioning schools’ treatment of artwork is especially unfortunate
in light of the numerous mental health-based alternatives to zero
tolerance which are particularly relevant for students who have dif-
ficulty expressing their feelings.  The most promising alternatives
to zero tolerance are social and emotional based strategies, which
seek to restructure school policy to provide a more nurturing and
safe environment for students.304  In their article Zero Tolerance and
Alternative Discipline Strategies, social scientists Skiba, Cohn, and
Canter recommended three alternatives to zero tolerance policies,
all of which are mental health centered strategies intended to util-
ize school psychologists, counselors, and social workers to provide
a student-centered response to behavior issues.305  The first alterna-
tive is the implementation of a school violence prevention curricu-
lum.  Major themes of violence prevention programs are
“socializing children, by promoting non-violent values such as egal-
itarian behavior and the right to be different.”306
A variety of curriculums advocate that school counselors and
psychologists work together with the community and parents, and
that the school implement an “effective” disciplinary policy.307  The
second alternative involves the use of social skills training and be-
304 See Brady, supra note 20; Challenging Behavior supra note 296; Skiba et al., supra
note 301.
305 Skiba et al., supra note 301.
306 University of Calagary, Prevention Programming, at http://www.ucalgary.ca/re-
solve/violenceprevention/English/pdf/Section2.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2005).
307 Id.
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havioral supports.308  Finally, the psychologists recommend that
schools employ early intervention strategies which “target low
levels of inappropriate behavior before they escalate into
violence.”309
Additionally, the Center for the Prevention of School Violence
(CPSV) suggests that peer mediation, teen courts, student based
groups like Students Against Violence Everywhere (S.A.V.E), and
conflict management help to increase safety in schools by involving
students in creating a safe environment.310 CPSV further recom-
mends that an increase in the number of school counselors in
given schools would allow them to provide crucial services that
could help make schools safer.  Most notably, counselors could
“team with other student services staff to develop an effective sys-
tem of referral and assessment for students exhibiting problem
behaviors.”311
These changes would allow a school to treat violent artwork
like artwork, and in an occasional case where artwork indicates a
deeper problem, provide true therapeutic intervention for the stu-
dent.  Of equal importance, schools would stop treating student
artwork like violence and allow students to express themselves cre-
atively in school.  The student mental health approach does not
have such a chilling effect on expression for two reasons.  First, it is
not punitive, and therefore may actually encourage students to
continue to express themselves in a creative manner.  Second, it
recognizes artwork and writing for what they are—creative expres-
sion of emotions.  This analysis insulates student creative expres-
sion from non-artwork centered analysis such as the true threat
doctrine.
E. The Positive Outcome
Should these changes be implemented, violent student art-
work and writing would be treated not as a threat of violence, but
as either expressive speech or a cry for help, depending on a coun-
selor, social worker, or school psychologist’s assessment of the
child.  A future artist could be nurtured, art could be recognized as
308 Id.
309 Id.
310 Pamela L. Riley, How to Establish and Maintain Safe, Orderly, and Caring Schools
(Center for the Prevention of School Violence, N.C.) at http://www.ncdjjdp.org/
cpsv/Acrobatfiles/SOC1pager.pdf.
311 NORTH CAROLINA CENTER FOR PREVENTION OF SCH. VIOLENCE, SCH. COUNSELORS
AND SCH. VIOLENCE: PREVENTION, INTERVENTION, AND CRISIS RESPONSE 4, at www.
ncdjjdp.org/cpsv/Acrobatfiles/counselors.pdf.
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a valuable expressive tool for a troubled child, and early warning
signs that a child is having emotional and psychological problems
could be effectively addressed.
The use of mental health professionals is essential.  Teachers,
administrators, and judges should not be the people evaluating the
content of such expression if they are inexperienced with child psy-
chology and art therapy.  Schools need to consult mental health
professionals rather than interpreting and responding to the work
without input.  The school in LaVine actually had a model initial
response to the poem James gave to his teacher to read.  The
teacher who was familiar with James and his prior work became
concerned that he wanted to harm himself and others when she
read the poem.  She consulted with the principal and the school
guidance counselor who had knowledge of problems James was go-
ing through at home.  They called the local mental health hotline
and received a referral to a psychiatrist.  They also called the local
police who went to James’s home to determine whether he needed
emergency psychiatric care.  James was subsequently examined by
the psychiatrist, who declared him mentally fit to return to school,
at which time he was allowed to return.312
Such a student mental health-centered response to violent stu-
dent artwork is highly preferable to the punitive approach so many
schools have adopted.  A more positive school environment fo-
cused on social and emotional learning rather than discipline is
the most effective way to make schools safer.  It also allows for
schools to listen to their students.  Michael Greene, Executive Di-
rector of the Violence Institute says, “first and foremost school offi-
cials, whether students or teachers or whoever, have to listen to
students in a non-judgmental manner.  Often, that’s all a child
needs—someone to talk to.  And that requires only minimal train-
ing.”313  When it comes to art, listening and not judging are key.
CONCLUSION
As the dissent in George T. remarked in reference to John
Donne’s poem Song: “ ‘[g]o and catch a falling star’ is not a com-
mand.”314  Yet, in the wake of an imagined trend of large-scale
school violence, courts and school administrators have ascribed in-
tent and means to harm to stick figures and rudimentary flames.
312 LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 984-86 (2001).
313 Brady, supra note 20.
314 In re George T., 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 384 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (Rushing, J.,
dissenting).
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They have turned fantasy and imagination into vivid reality.  Strik-
ingly, they have transferred a great deal of power to children, ig-
noring the true power imbalance between child and adult, student
and teacher.  With this attribution of power comes adult-level crim-
inal charges and juvenile detention.
Using the myth of Columbine, the courts have employed an
analytical backdrop that casts every student as a potential mass
murderer.  This analysis blatantly ignores the reality that children
may find art to be a cathartic, safe, and non-violent form of creative
expression.  The analysis also ignores the short and long-term con-
sequences of chilling students’ speech.  Punishing students for
peaceful expression through art takes away an immediate outlet for
feelings of frustration and rage and may increase the likelihood of
future violent outbursts.  As troubled students seeking alternatives
to violence are thwarted in their quest, students who seeks to be
artists are taught that there is no safe place for dissent or for rage
within their work.  This lesson, that art is equally a weapon and a
threat, forms the foundation of a student’s understanding of art
and its role in society.
Whether Milo, Douglas, or Julius are the artists of the next
generation remains to be seen.  Regardless, at the heart of this dis-
cussion of legal rights and societal ramifications lies the simple fact
that these are troubled children who used a non-violent medium to
communicate anger and frustration.  Art by nature is constructive
rather than destructive.  For generations, people have used it to
share, and sometimes even exorcise, their deepest and darkest feel-
ings.  Bukowski, the “suicide kid,” grew up to write poems that
changed the face of American literature.  Julius, the “next Colum-
bine kid,” should be given the same opportunity to turn anger into
art, regardless of whether it is beautiful or frightening.
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